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ABSTRACT 
The Air Force Officer Evaluation System’s purpose is to provide feedback, 
document a record of performance and potential, and provide centralized 
selection boards sound information for decision making.  Officer Performance 
Reports are, and have historically been, considered “inflated.” This research 
assumes inflation is counter to the purpose of the evaluation system and 
investigates why historical inertia towards inflation exists.  This is done by 
viewing the evaluation system as an “open system” and using organization, 
behavior, evaluation, and game theory to analyze organizational structure, 
culture, rewards, people, and tasks in U.S. military systems to identify elements 
that contribute to or inhibit inflation.  The structure of the military, military culture, 
and the role of performance evaluations in the promotion and reward systems all 
directly support inflation.  Changing the evaluation form reduces inflation in the 
short term, but a whole systems approach must be taken to combat inflation in 
the long term.  While some elements are unlikely to change only to reduce 
inflation, the analysis suggests the tool must be changed to permit rater 
accountability, culture must be altered to accept accurate evaluations, and small 
changes in structure and reward systems might be made to reduce the long-term 
tendency of evaluation inflation. 
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Each United States military service has an officer evaluation system.  
Across the services, variance exists on perceptions of respective systems; some 
officers will state that “their” system is “OK,” but most will agree that the 
evaluation system either is inflated, was inflated (but less so now based on a new 
system), and/or is subject to manipulation counter to the stated purpose of the 
system. 
Many groups and individuals have looked at the issue of performance 
evaluation inflation or inadequacy of evaluation systems at some time or another.  
These people include private organizations, groups comprised of senior military 
and retired officers, military officers at service-specific schools, military students 
at civilian universities, and individual officers (e.g., Air Force Human Resources 
Laboratory, 1971; Blakelock, 1976; Doorley, 1981; Hamilton, 2002; Kite, 1998; 
Lewis, 1999; Marvin, 1996; Olsen & Oakman, 1979; Robbert, Keltner, Reynolds, 
Spranca, & Benjamin, 1997; Syllogistics & the Hay Group, 1987; Wayland, 2002; 
Wharton, 1966).  Military services have availed themselves of evaluation 
expertise from academia, private businesses, and in-house experts.  Most 
research on military evaluation systems has highlighted some form of 
dissatisfaction with officer evaluation systems and a recurring theme of inflation.   
Research has most often focused on the evaluation tool (the evaluation 
form[s]) and has often revealed officer opinions on satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
with the system, but it has rarely addressed the organization and environment in 
which the tool was used.  A Syllogistics (1987) report discussed the evaluation 
tool with respect to organizational culture, but concluded that since the 
organization was unlikely to change, it would focus on the tool to combat 
weaknesses in the evaluation process and to enhance the purposes for which 
the evaluation system was used. 
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To one extent or another, most research assessed attributes of the 
evaluation tool studied, actual utilization of the tool (vs. proscribed use of the 
tool), and offered suggestions for improvement.  Evaluation tools were compared 
against performance measurement theory and, in some cases, it was concluded 
that the tools lacked relevance or were ineffective for the purpose for which they 
were used (Doorley, 1981; Kite, 1998; Syllogistics, 1987; Wayland, 2002).  
Research has addressed concerns about consistency and discriminating 
capabilities of evaluation systems (both issues often associated with inflation).  
While evaluation theory states that evaluation systems should have specific 
goals, such as promotion, growth and development, feedback, assignments, or 
school selection (but not all simultaneously), military evaluations are often used 
for all the aforementioned goals.  These different goals for a single evaluation 
tool are generally not compatible. 
Even if the tool studied theoretically adhered to evaluation theory 
principles, implementation of the evaluation system was not consistent with 
directives.  Specifically, when active control measures were in place to reduce 
inflation in numerical and categorical scoring systems, raters often resorted to 
writing evaluations based on individual officer career needs as opposed to writing 
accurate evaluations.  For example, in the United States Army (USA), an officer 
meeting a promotion board would be given an “above center of mass” (ACOM) 
rating over an officer who deserved the ACOM rating but was not meeting a 
board (Hamilton, 2002, p. 15).  This deliberate choice to write an evaluation 
based on the situation as opposed to how the rater truly ranked the ratees was a 
result of ACOM quota controls in place to minimize inflation.  In the United States 
Air Force (USAF), raters have either been pressured to stratify (rank amongst a 
set or subset of individuals [Milkovich & Boudreau, 1994, p. 177]) an individual or 
have been told that stratification would not be given; stratification would be given 
to the individual coming up on a promotion board, regardless of actual rankings. 
Various methods to combat inflation have been instituted over the years, 
some successful, some not.  The United States Navy (USN) uses the rater’s 
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overall rating average on a numerical rating system to depict how the rater 
viewed the ratee.  This enables a board to view relative scores.  For example, a 
ratee receiving an average numerical rating of 3.5, with the rater’s average at 
3.1, shows a relative above-average score, while a 4.6 of 4.8 is below average 
(Lewis, 1999, p. 38).  The rater’s average rating scores may also be included into 
the rater’s evaluation as an incentive to adhere to the spirit of the evaluation 
system.  Another method to combat inflation includes formalized training of raters 
(Milkovich & Boudreau, 1994).   
When methods to combat inflation, such as quotas or secret scoring 
based on rater’s section of items on the evaluation form, were implemented, 
resistance and non-acceptance of the methods were often encountered 
(Syllogistics, 1987, pp. I-2 – I-5).  Finally, one article (Wayland, 2002) suggested 
that attempting to compare functionally different groups (such as operations, 
logistics, operations support, intelligence, maintenance, etc.) increased pressure 
to inflate ratings within the functions to ensure competitiveness at a central 
promotion board.  This suggests that the structure of the military as a large, 
bureaucratic organization and its processes for individual advancement within the 
organization may influence individuals to inflate evaluations. 
In the review of previous research on the inflation of evaluations, it 
became clear that each military service has experienced, or is experiencing, 
inflation.  Each service has attempted multiple times to curtail or eliminate 
evaluation inflation, but none of the research viewed attempted to analyze why 
the military evaluation systems continually regress to an inflated state.  According 
to Wexley (1979), most performance appraisal research focuses on the tool and 
methods of evaluation, but neglects the organizational influences that may 
“reduce the effectiveness of even the finest performance appraisal system” (p. 
255).  The purpose of this research is to view the Air Force organization and its 
evaluation system with respect to organization, behavior, evaluation, and game 
theory to attempt to answer the question of why its evaluations continually 
regress to an inflated state.   
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B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Assumptions 
The two main assumptions for this thesis research are that the USAF 
Officer Performance Report (OPR) is inflated and that this phenomenon of 
inflation is dysfunctional and undermines the stability and purpose of the 
evaluation system.  “Inflation” is the exaggerated, hyperbolic, pretentious, 
amplified, hyped description or scoring of an individual or an individual’s 
accomplishments.  An organization or system can still function if it is 
dysfunctional, but it often does so through alternate processes.  It is important to 
recognize a dysfunctional system so that an organization can take steps to 
identify and fix the problem or establish controls within the system in order to 
mitigate the effects of the dysfunctional element(s). 
Inflation is assumed dysfunctional based on service statements detailing 
the stated purpose of the evaluation systems: 
The Officer and Enlisted Evaluation Systems have varied purposes. 
The first is to provide meaningful feedback to individuals on what is 
expected of them, advice on how well they are meeting those 
expectations, and advice on how to better meet those expectations. 
The second is to provide a reliable, long-term, cumulative record of 
performance and potential based on that performance. The third is 
to provide officer central selection boards, senior NCO evaluation 
boards, the Weighted Airman Promotion System (WAPS) and other 
personnel managers sound information to assist in identifying the 
best qualified officers and enlisted personnel. (USAF, 2005, p. 6) 
The ERS [evaluation reporting system – added] identifies Soldiers 
who are best qualified for promotion and assignments to positions 
of greater responsibility. ERS also identifies Soldiers who will be 
kept on active duty, be retained in grade, or eliminated from 
Service…The primary function of ERS is to provide information to 
HQDA for use in making personnel management decisions. This 
information is supplied to HQDA by the rating chain in the Soldier’s 
assigned or attached organization... Reports that are incomplete or 
fail to provide a realistic and objective evaluation will make 
personnel management decisions difficult. (USA, 2007, pp. 2–3) 
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FITREPs on officers, CHIEFEVALs on chief petty officers (CPOs), 
and EVALs on other enlisted personnel are used for many career 
actions, including selection for promotion, advanced training, 
specialization or sub-specialization, and responsible duty 
assignments. Timely, realistic, and accurate reports are essential 
for each of these tasks. (USN, 2008, p. I–1) 
The fitness report provides the primary means for evaluating a 
Marine’s performance to support the Commandant’s efforts to 
select the best qualified personnel for promotion, augmentation, 
retention, resident schooling, command, and duty assignments.  
The completion of fitness reports is a critical leadership 
responsibility.  Inherent in this duty is the commitment of our 
commanders and all reporting officials to ensure the integrity of the 
system by giving close attention to accurate marking, narrative 
assessment, and timely reporting.  Every commander and reporting 
official must ensure the scrupulous maintenance of the PES 
[performance evaluation system – added].  Inaccurate evaluations 
only serve to dilute the actual value of each report.  
(USMC, 2006, p. 2) 
These references demonstrate that the USAF, USA, USN, and the United 
States Marine Corps (USMC) use these systems in order to make decisions, 
often at centralized decision-making boards, regarding the advancement of 
military officers, whether in rank, duty location, or duty responsibilities.  This 
suggests that evaluation systems, and more specifically, the tools used for 
evaluation, should provide discriminating capability to differentiate organizational 
members (Wexley, 1997, p. 253).  If the information provided is inaccurate, are 
the decisions valid?  If it is recognized that the systems are inflated and thus 
inaccurate, then it is possible to overcome this issue through informal practices, 
such as the impact of “specific” words, or the presence or absence of specific 
information, such as stratification or completion of advanced degrees.  It is 
possible, but not easy; it is possible, but contingent on everyone understanding 
the informal practices.  This thesis does not investigate the question of whether 
the right people are being put in the right positions (through promotion and job 
allocation), but only focuses on why inflation happens.   
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2. Variables 
For the purposes of research, the dependent variable is the quality of 
officer evaluations.  This dependent variable is either inflated or accurate.   The 
independent variables are the organizational structure of the military 
organization, officer-specific reward system, system of officer promotion, officer 
evaluation tools and processes, military culture, and the human element.  
3. Hypothesis 
The organizational structure of the military, officer-specific reward system, 
processes and tools of evaluation, promotion system, organizational culture, and 
the interaction between individuals influence personnel to inflate evaluations over 
time.  Addressing the root cause of organizational factors and/or implementing 
controls on known factors in the various tools for evaluation would reduce the 
inertia towards evaluation inflation.  In addition, addressing one element is 
insufficient to stem inflation; it requires a “whole of system” approach. 
4. Design and Methodology 
This research takes a novel view of the USAF evaluation system to 
assess whether factors inherent in the organization are responsible for continued 
inflation of officer evaluations.  Its purpose is not to create a new system of 
evaluation, and it does not focus on military officers’ perceptions of any system.  
Instead, this research focuses on: (a) structure and congruity from the 
perspective of organization theory; (b) the purposes of evaluations and the 
advantages and disadvantages of evaluation systems from the perspective of 
evaluation theory; (c) the position of an individual in an organization and how 
interactions occur within that system from the perspective of behavior theory; and 
(d) the choice selection made by rational actors within a system from the 
dynamic perspective of game theory.   
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Subsystems in the U.S. military organization are explored from each 
theoretical perspective.  The independent variables are analyzed through these 
theories to highlight those subsystems that influence evaluation inflation.  After 
the U.S. military is viewed as a whole, service-specific systems are compared to 
look at similarities, differences, and controls inherent in their systems. 
The research map is as follows: 
 Chapter II focuses on organizations, systems, and 
subsystems.  It details elements of the military organization 
that are similar across the services.  It ties elements of 
theory, especially organizational and behavior theory, to 
systems and subsystems in the larger military organization. 
 Chapter III briefly explores evaluation theory and delves into 
how the respective services execute their evaluation system.  
As there is a direct connection between evaluations and 
promotion systems in the military (Robbert et al., 1997, p. 
15), and as each service has a slightly different way of 
implementing their promotion system, service-specific 
promotion systems are also analyzed. 
 Chapter IV analyzes the independent variables of 
organizational structure, reward systems, officer promotions, 
officer evaluations, military culture, and the human element 
to demonstrate how each of these subsystems influence 
inflation. 
 Chapter V wraps up with a conclusion based on the analysis 
of the variables and recommendations on how to proceed.  
Two main issues raised are: (a) if the system is functional, 
does it necessarily need to change?  And, (b) in order to 
change, multiple subsystems (or elements in the evaluation 
system) must be changed to counter the inertia of the 
system towards inflation.  Additional research topics that 
might be complementary to this research subject are also 
recommended. 
This research focuses on the following sources for information: 
 Theoretical writings on organization, behavior, evaluation, 
and game theory 
 Previous military evaluation research 
 Government rules and regulations on military officers, their 
promotion, and extrinsic compensation 
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 Service-specific standard operating procedures (rules and 
regulations) 
 Personal interviews with senior military officers to clarify 
formal processes and to unearth informal processes 
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II. ORGANIZATIONS, SYSTEMS, AND SUBSYSTEMS 
A. OPEN SYSTEM VIEW 
One can take two approaches when looking at any system—viewing the 
system as a “black box” or as a “white box.”  A black-box approach takes the 
system as a whole, without seeking to understand the individual elements or 
processes within.  It is an abstract view and more appropriate when looking at 
macro level analysis.  It focuses on the input and the output, without regard for 
the transformation processes (or internal environment) that transform inputs into 
outputs.  A white-box approach is concerned with the processes that transform 
inputs into outputs.  It focuses on the interaction between the individual 
subsystems or elements (Heylighen, 1998). 
Because the research hypothesis states that inflation within the evaluation 
system is caused by elements, or subsystems, within the system, it is proper to 
view the system as a white box and to investigate the elements within the system 
and their interactions with each other.   The model depicted in Figure 1 
conceptualizes evaluations as a system within a greater military environment, 
with inputs, a transformation process (containing the subsystems of 
organizational structure, culture, tasks/tools, people, and reward systems), and 
an output.  The evaluation system itself is just one subsystem in the greater 
military system.  In addition, the subsystems of structure, culture, tasks/tools, 
people, and rewards also reside as subsystems inside the greater military 
system.  For conceptualization, the evaluation system is viewed as a concrete 
system with subsystems that affect the transformation process.  Each subsystem 
within the transformation process interacts with every other subsystem; structure 
















Figure 1.   Open System View of the Evaluation System (After Kates & Galbraith, 
2007; Mercer-Delta, 1998; Nadler & Tushman, 1988, 1997) 
Each subsystem is studied to assess whether it affects evaluation quality 
in some form or another.  This chapter addresses subsystems that are similar 
across the services.  Service-specific aspects of strategy and tasks (such as the 
completion of evaluations and the processes of promotion) are addressed in the 
next chapter.  
B. INPUTS 
Nadler and Tushman (1997) divide inputs into three major categories: 
environment, resources, and history.  While the traditional environment of a 
system includes other institutions, events, social and economic forces, and legal 
constraints, the only environmental factor applicable in this study of the 
evaluation system is governmental regulatory guidelines.  These regulatory 
guidelines place demands and impose constraints on military strength. 
The United States Government (USG) Title 10 (armed forces) codes 115 
and 115a (2007) state that Congress must authorize military strength levels 
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yearly.  The Secretary of Defense must submit annual manpower requirements, 
broken down into service and major force units, delineating the required force 
strength per rank/grade for commissioned officers.  The request must be further 
broken down into end-of-quarter strength requirements in addition to end of year 
strength requirements.  In conjunction with the request for manpower, the 
Secretary must also estimate upcoming changes in the force structure based on 
projected retirements, discharges, separations, deaths, and promotions for the 
upcoming fiscal year and five fiscal years out.   
Congress further authorizes (Title 10, sec. 523, 2007) the breakdown of 
the officer corps into authorized strength levels per grade based on the total force 
strength.  Provisions exist for deviations from congressionally mandated 
numbers.  Regardless, the governmental laws dictating the size and distribution 
of the military forces are an environmental input in to the evaluation system and 
affect the interaction of the various subsystems. 
Resources include people, technology, and information input into a 
system.  While it may also include an organization’s perception or climate, this 
analysis subsumes these under the internal element of culture.  The people that 
go into the system are the individuals being evaluated; as everyone in the military 
is evaluated, every person will eventually be an input into the evaluation system.   
The final input element is the history of a system (or organization).  As 
was discussed in the introduction, the history and evolution of evaluation systems 
have shown that they generally revert to an inflated state.  This history also 
affects the people and the cultural element.  History, or institutional memory, can 
be a constant input into the evaluation system as a barrier to change or as a 




Strategy involves a set of decisions on how to manage resources within 
the context of demands, opportunities, and constraints posed by the 
environment, consistent with an organization’s history and culture (Mercer-Delta, 
1998, p. 6).  The strategy of the evaluation system is service-specific and 
contained within each service specific standard operating procedure (SOP) 
manual. 
D. STRUCTURE 
It would be hard to dispute that the U.S. military is anything other than a 
bureaucracy in a divisional structure. There are, however, elements of other 
organizational structures contained within the military.  The military, at the 
operational level of analysis (that which occurs in the middle levels of each 
service), is more of a professional machine, as described below. 
An accurate description of the elements of an organization is important in 
order to see how parts interact with each other and how they influence 
operations within an organization.  It is also important to understand that at 
different levels of analysis, an organization changes; those “structural” changes 
have inherent advantages and disadvantages. 
Mintzberg (1981) stated there are five distinct, coherent configurations in 
organizational structure: simple configuration, adhocracy, machine bureaucracy, 
professional bureaucracy, and divisional (or diversified).  Each configuration has 
certain characteristics and specific dominant features.  Each configuration also 
has an environment in which it optimally operates.  These configurations are 
chosen because their separate parts function effectively together in the 
environment in which they are optimal.   
The defined configurations of Mintzberg’s structures are made up of five 
distinct elements: the strategic apex, the operating core, the middle line, the 
technostructure, and the support staff.  The apex is the top management; the 
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operating core does the basic work; the middle line is the intermediate managers; 
the technostructure does formal planning and controls the work; and the support 
staff provides indirect services to the rest of the organization.  The variances in 
organization of these elements make up the five distinct core structures. 
The environment in which an organization operates optimally can be 
defined with regard to the level of stability and complexity of that environment.  
Figure 2 shows the arrangement:  
 
 
Figure 2.   Mintzberg’s Basic Organization Structures (After Mintzberg, 1981) 
A machine bureaucracy is optimal in a stable, simple environment.  Stable 
refers to an environment that remains predictable, whereas unstable involves 
rapid change in the environment.  A simple environment is one where there are 
Simple 
Configuration 
 Coordination:  
Direct supervision 
 Dominant element:  
Strategic apex 
 Little specialization, 






 Coordination:  
Mutual adjustment 
 Dominant element:  
Support staff 
 Much specialization and 
training 




Standardization of work 
processes 
 Dominant element: 
Technostructure 
 Formalized, specialized 





Standardization of skills 
 Dominant element: 
Operating core 
 Specialized and highly 
trained 
 Some formalization 
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few or similar external factors affecting the organization, whereas a complex 
environment has many or diverse, interdependent external factors (Daft, 1998, p. 
88).  A professional bureaucracy is optimal in a stable, complex environment.   
In the context of the evaluation system, the environment is stable.  The 
evaluation system operates in a semi-complex environment where there are 
many diverse external factors, such as people, different units within the larger 
organization, different operations/tasks that occur, and different sub-cultures.  A 
brief synopsis of element characteristics of a bureaucracy is depicted in Table 1. 








SOPs Standardization of Skills Combination of both 
Training and 
indoctrination Little Much Much 
Formalization of 
behavior Formal Little Formal and Informal 
Span of Control 




Large span of 
control 
Large span of control for 
reporting elements 
Planning and 
control systems Large amounts Little Large amounts 




Selective horizontal and 
vertical decentralization; 
output feeds a centralized 
system 
Table 1.   Characteristics of Bureaucratic Structures (After Mintzberg, 1981) 
Mintzberg (1981) describes the characteristics associated with the 
structural organization and explains how different parts interact with each other.  
Coordination within an organization refers to how the strategic apex maintains 
control of an organization based on its goals and how it achieves unity of effort.  
A machine bureaucracy is optimized for mass production with products, 
processes, and distribution systems following standard procedures.  The military 
is full of functional specialties that rely on SOPs to ensure jobs are (at an abstract 
level) the same, no matter where you are stationed (an F-16 mechanic in Aviano 
AB, Italy, is the same as an F-16 mechanic at Hill AFB, Utah; a personnelist at 
 15
the Presido in Monterey, CA, does the same job as a personnelist at Cannon 
AFB, NM).  This is essential due to the nature of the military, where people move 
around much more often than is experienced in the civilian world. 
Within a professional bureaucracy, the environment is much more 
complex (yet still stable) and the operating core receives considerably more 
training and requires control over the actual tasks.  Professional bureaucracies 
are often associated with hospitals or universities.  Each person in the operating 
core receives a commensurate level of training, is expected to meet certain 
standards, and must attain certain certifications.  The strategic apex relies on the 
standardization of skills in order to realize the organization’s goals.  The military, 
too, is like the professional bureaucracy in that both enlisted and officers receive 
extensive training in order to accomplish their tasks.  They are professionals that 
are educated and expected to exhibit judgment outside SOPs in order to make 
decisions based on encountered situations.   
The evaluation “organization” is effectively a mesh of the two types of 
organizations.  There are SOPs that dictate when and how to accomplish the 
task, but the system still relies on professional military officers to use their 
training and judgment to accomplish the task.  At the next highest level, the 
organization is a divisional structure (not shown in Figure 2), relying on 
standardization of output from each division.  The divisional structure is a hollow 
structure that contains other sub-structures.  Its coordination is done primarily 
through the standardization of outputs, and its dominant element is the middle 
line, the managers of the individual sub-organizations. Each military element 
(such as a squadron, wing, battalion, etc.) is a division that should optimally 
provide standardized evaluations to the higher levels, so that decisions about 
personnel can be made at a centralized location. 
Training, indoctrination, and formalization are all about how a worker 
receives guidance on how to accomplish a task.  Formalization is most often 
associated with SOPs; training is most often associated with professionalism.  
Indoctrination can be used in either case.  In the evaluation system, and even in 
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the military as a whole, training, indoctrination, and formalization are all present.  
The military standardizes and formalizes the evaluation processes because 
evaluations are used at a centralized decision-making board for promotion, 
assignment, or some other human resource decision.  By standardizing these 
processes, it theoretically makes it easier to compare evaluations across 
disparate groups of officers.  The people involved in the evaluation process are 
trained professional officers and trained support staff.  Additionally, the military 
carries out indoctrination throughout an officer’s career, whether it is prior to 
commissioning, while assigned in individual units, or in various professional 
schools throughout.  This indoctrination naturally affects the culture and the 
individuals involved in the system. 
Span of control (Daft, 2004) is the number of people directly reporting to 
the next level of the organization.  In a machine bureaucracy, this is generally 
small until the management intersects with the operating core.  In a professional 
bureaucracy, it is much higher, resulting in a flatter organization.  In the 
evaluation system, it depends on where the evaluations are accomplished.  With 
different spans of control, different officers are directly compared against different 
types and numbers of officers, depending on where the evaluation is done.  A 
rater that rates only one officer has a different situation than a rater who rates 15 
officers of the same rank. 
The planning and control of systems all allude to future states within the 
organization.  Planning is generally associated with standardization (exactly how 
things are done), whereas control refers to a more generalized state (such as 
growth or profit).   The evaluation system plans and controls the elements within 
the system.  Evaluations are done on a timescale and are used to make 
decisions about future states of the larger military organization, such as force 
strength or job positions, often based on the “environment” input of government 
law. 
Centralization is broken into two aspects: vertical and horizontal.  Vertical 
centralization (or decentralization) is the allocation of decision making.  
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Horizontal centralization (or decentralization) is control over the decision 
processes vice the actual decisions.  In a machine bureaucracy, the 
technostructure is given some authority to control processes (limited horizontal 
decision making); in a professional bureaucracy, decisions and decision 
processes are decentralized both vertically and horizontally.  In the evaluation 
system, there is selective decentralization both horizontally and vertically.  
Decision processes are standardized within the technostructure (horizontally), yet 
decisions made in the evaluations are devolved down the organizational line to 
the people most closely associated with the ones being evaluated.  Credible 
evaluations from the highest levels on the lowest levels are unlikely due to the 
size of the military organization and the lack of direct observation.  The 
decentralized evaluations are then funneled up to a centralized location for 
decisions regarding promotions, assignments, or other crucial determinations. 
Within the overall structure, there are two sub elements: formal 
arrangement and informal arrangement.  Mercer-Delta (1998) describes the 
formal arrangement as the formal structures and processes to coordinate 
activities to accomplish objectives.  These are structures and processes detailed 
in service specific regulations.  The informal arrangements are process practices 
and political relationships.  These informal practices are the “word of mouth,” 
best practices, and mentorship training that military members receive regarding 
evaluations throughout their career; more informally, this is how things “are really 
done.”  These elements of structure and task accomplishment are service-
specific and are discussed in the next chapter.  
E. REWARD SYSTEMS 
People join organizations and are motivated based on the rewards they 
expect to receive.  Rewards can be categorized into two types: intrinsic and 
extrinsic.  Both types of rewards are useful in satisfying Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs (physiological, safety, belongingness and love, esteem, and self-
actualization [Lawler, 1973]). 
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1. Intrinsic Rewards/Motivation 
Intrinsic motivation occurs when “people are interested in, and enjoy, what 
they are doing” (Cameron & Pierce, 2002, p. 12).  Intrinsic rewards include 
affiliation, equity, mental/physical stimulation, achievement, competence, self-
growth, and self-actualization (Lawler, 1973, pp. 16–25).  In the military, intrinsic 
rewards include: service to one’s country; the performance of exciting and 
interesting missions; work with advanced, sophisticated, and expensive 
equipment; teamwork with like-minded individuals; advancement to higher levels 
of responsibility; and the pride of military membership (Robbert et al., 1997, p. 
14).  These elements are also often associated with the culture of the military.  
2. Extrinsic Rewards/Motivation 
Extrinsic rewards are those rewards that are tangible outcomes given to 
an employee.  Extrinsic motivation comes from “behaviors in which an external 
controlling variable can be readily identified” (Cameron & Pierce, 2002, p. 12).  
These can be based on position or specific accomplishments.  Lawler (2000, p. 
112) describes the importance of rewards to different people.  In some cases, 
pay is the most important motivating incentive.  In other cases, pay is not 
important and socializing is more motivating.  In civilian organizations, managers 
attempt to link rewards to what motivates their people.  In civilian organizations, 
rewards are often tied to organizational results (such as profit).  Civilian 
organizations generally have more latitude to decentralize the application of their 
reward systems and may have greater variability in the rewards they are able to 
offer. 
The military, as a bureaucratic organization, is limited in the ways that it 
uses variance in extrinsic rewards to motivate its people.  Military compensation 
can be categorized as “task non-contingent rewards,” (Cameron & Pierce, 2002, 
p. 43) where it is given regardless of involvement in a specific activity or a 
specific level of accomplishment of an activity.  The military does not have 
definitive goals on which to base compensation; the military does not exist to 
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make a profit and goals such as “making the country safe” or “furthering U.S. 
objectives” are non-quantifiable for the purposes of extrinsic compensation. The 
military uses a standardized system of compensation and each service member 
receives the same extrinsic rewards for serving in the military.  It has a neutral 
reward system where everyone of a certain characteristic (rank) receives the 
same reward (Kerr, 1997, p. xvii).  The difference in these rewards is based 
solely on grade (rank), time-in-grade, special pay for specific skills, or in 
compensation for assignment at specific geographic locations.  Eligibility for 
these rewards is not based on the quality of one’s evaluation, nor is it dependent 
on whether the military organization “accomplishes” its goals.  The following are 
examples of extrinsic rewards for military members (Robbert et al., 1997,  
pp. 10–12): 
 Pay and allowances (base pay, housing, subsistence) 
 Paid vacation (leave) (2 ½ days per month) 
 Special pay (flight, hazardous, separation, sea duty, foreign 
language, retention bonuses, etc.) 
 Access to services (childcare, housing, commissary, 
exchange, health [medical and dental]) 
 Additional opportunities (education assistance, GI Bill, 
professional military education) 
 Retirement benefits (after completing 20 years of service) 
Promotion selection affects the rewards received by a military member; 
the promotion system uses evaluations (in addition to other variables) to 
determine who should be promoted, and therefore, receive greater compensation 
and status (Robbert et al., 1997, pp. 15–16).     
Overall, motivation of military members is not as influenced by extrinsic 
rewards as the private sector due to the inability to increase pay, give bonuses, 
or expect promotion, except as mandated by Congress through force strength 
and limitations on grade quotas (Robbert et al., 1997).  In fact, Robbert et al. 
(1997) posit that military members are more motivated by intrinsic over extrinsic 
rewards (p. 14).  Based on the standardization of compensation, military 
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members view it as a means to satisfy basic needs (Maslow – physiological and 
security).  As part of Robbert’s (2007) assessment of military human resource 
management (HRM), focus groups were conducted about rewards and their 
affect on work.  Pay was rated an average of 2.27 on a scale of 1 (“had no effect 
on your work”) to 4 (“had a large effect on your work”), where “feeling like a 
valued and respected member of your unit” was rated as 3.24 out of 4.  This was 
considered significant, with p <.05 (p. 73).  While the sample size was small, it is 
consistent with perceptions of military culture.  
The military reward system is not considered causal to evaluation inflation 
because 1) compensation happens after the fact, and 2) because evaluations 
affect promotion, which then affects only certain aspects of compensation.  The 
expectation that good evaluations will help promotion selection influences the 
inflation of evaluations. 
Awards and decorations bridge the gap between extrinsic and intrinsic 
rewards.  There is no physical compensation related to it; however, it is overt 
recognition by leadership of one’s accomplishments, and continued recognition 
through visible devices (ribbons and/or medals) with other military members.  In 
addition, awards and decorations may affect promotion selection (Robbert et al., 
1997, pp. 15 & 17). 
3. Promotion 
Promotion affects extrinsic compensation (directly) and may contain an 
element of intrinsic value.  Promotion also affects whether an officer may remain 
in the military to complete a career with retirement benefits.  While ultimately 
governed by the USG, the actual promotion system is service-specific. 
USG code states that the Secretary of any military department will hold 
promotion boards when the needs of the service requires (Title 10, sec. 611, 
2007).  The board will be comprised of officers representative of the officers 
being considered for promotion (sec. 612, 2007).  Officers will be evaluated 
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solely on their records, any specific elements a service determines is important 
(after approval by the Secretary of Defense), and any authorized written 
communication from the individual to the board (sec. 615, 2007).  Individuals 
must serve a specific amount of time-in-grade before being eligible for promotion 
(sec. 619).  Individual services will determine competitive categories (sec. 621, 
2007).  The Secretary of the military service will determine the number of officers 
eligible for promotion to the next rank based on the force strength and limitations 
on numbers of each rank, as approved by Congress, as well as the number of 
officers eligible to meet the promotion zone, based on a five-year forecast 
(sections 622 & 623, 2007).  In addition, the promotion board is limited from 
promoting officers below the zone by a specific percentage (sec. 616, 2007).  
Once selected for promotion, officers are promoted when there is need for that 
target rank and competitive category from the promotion list (sec. 624, 2007).  
The promotion system is a standardized, formalized process. 
If an O–2 is not selected for promotion after two looks, he/she will be 
involuntarily discharged or retired (if eligible) (sec. 631, 2007).  If an O–3 or O–4 
fails to promote after two looks (while in or above the promotion zone), he/she 
will be involuntarily discharged or retired (if eligible) (sec. 632, 2007).  O–5s who 
are not promoted must retire at 28 years of service (sec. 633, 2007).  O–6s who 
do not promote must retire at 30 years of service (sec. 634, 2007).  The military 
system uses, at its core, an “up or out” system of promotion.   
While the system is “up or out,” a special continuation board may 
determine (based on the needs of the services) that members passed over for 
promotion may remain on active duty until 20 years (for O–3s, unless they 
subsequently promote) or 24 years (for O–4s, unless they subsequently promote) 
(sec. 637, 2007).  Based on the needs of the military and its ability to attain its 
desired force strength, some members are selected to remain on active duty and 
become eligible for retirement at 20 years. 
In addition, if Congress mandates reduction in the size of the military, the 
services can convene special boards to select officers for early retirement or for 
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discharge, regardless if they promoted or not (sec. 647, 2007).  This was done 
recently in the AF during their 2006 and 2007 force shaping initiatives (Gettle, 
2006) and in the 1990s (Government Accounting Office, 1993) for the entire 
military.  
The military reward and promotion systems are highly standardized, highly 
controlled, and centrally managed.  When variable extrinsic reward systems are 
not available to influence behavior in an organization, managers turn to 
“organizational missions” or “culture” to enforce compliance and create 
cohesiveness (Wilson, 2000). 
F. CULTURE 
Culture and its effects on individuals are difficult to quantify.  It varies 
between individuals and it varies within elements and sub-elements of an 
organization.  What is culture and why is it important?   
Soeters, Winslow, and Weibull (2003) state that culture is a common 
interpretation of the environment, where ideas, interpretations, and norms are 
taken for granted.  Sathe (1985) states that culture is often unstated assumptions 
that members share in common.  Military culture defines how things are done in 
the military organization.  It includes its values, customs, traditions, and 
philosophical underpinnings.  This culture creates an environment where there 
are common expectations in standards of behavior, discipline, teamwork, loyalty, 
selfless duty, and customs that support those elements (Dorn, Graves, Ulmer, 
Collins, & Jacobs, 2000, p. xviii).   
Culture is what managers try to instill into their organization.  Culture to an 
organization is what a personality is to an individual (Schein, 2004, pp. 7–8). 
Once an organization has a specific culture, it is hard to change.  Each 
organization will attempt to pass on that culture to the next generation (Schein, 
2004, pp. 14, 18). 
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The military itself is often viewed as a separate social phenomenon, a 
separate social institution that has a distinctive set of behaviors, rules, norms, 
and values (Nuciari, 2003, p. 61).  Each military service has its own set of norms 
and values.  Even within each service, sub-elements have their own specific set 
of norms and values.  The most obvious signs of military culture are the stated 
values:  Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do (USAF, 
n.d.); Honor, Courage, Commitment (USN, n.d. [included USMC]); and Loyalty, 
Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage (USA, 
n.d.).  This is what the military advertises, what it attempts to instill into its people, 
and what the public perceives.  Robbert et al. (1997) link military culture to 
service, duty, patriotism, integrity, trust, and the belief of the importance of the 
organization with a noble purpose (p. 38).  Dorn et al. (2000, p. 5) states, at a 
higher level, that military culture is imbued with loyalty to comrades, unit, and 
nation. 
Culture also has external influences.  The general public’s perception and 
opinion of the military influences how the military views itself and how it strives to 
uphold those external perceptions.  Gallup (Saad, 2009) has conducted its 
“Confidence in Institutions” polls continuously since 1973.  The U.S. military has 
consistently ranked either number one or number two since it began and has 
been number one continuously since 1998.  It is obvious from the sample that the 
public has a high opinion of the U.S. military.  Military members are continuously 
reminded of their role as “ambassadors of the military,” both on- and off-duty. 
Dorn et al. (2000) conducted a survey of Army, Marine Corps, Coast 
Guard and senior joint task force staffs over how members felt about their 
organization.  Some important elements to take away from this survey were that 
there was intrinsic satisfaction from being in the armed forces, individuals were 
proud of serving, individuals were proud of their high standards of behavior and 
performance, and there was a strong personal commitment to duty.  Within the 
focus groups conducted, there was strong commitment to excellence and strong 
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support for traditional military values.  Individuals truly felt that the military culture 
reinforced the idea that military service is a “unique calling and a solemn 
responsibility” (pp. 47–48). 
G. PEOPLE 
Other subsystems in the evaluation system greatly affect the people 
subsystem.  Organizational culture influences people.  Through that, they tend to 
embody a specific set of institutional values that ultimately affect their decision 
making (Oliver, 1991).  
Each person in the organization occupies a place in the structure, or 
hierarchy.  Most important to this research is the place held as a supervisor (or 
rater) and as a subordinate (a ratee).  The supervisor is subject to the formal and 
informal processes established in order to function within the evaluation system.  
Supervisors have responsibilities both to their supervisors and to their 
subordinates.  Military officers are inculcated with the responsibility to take care 
of their people.  This is in addition to the culture of loyalty to one’s comrades. 
As a ratee, an individual is aware of the importance of evaluations with 
respect to one’s career.  People receive both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards in the 
military.  The value of those types of rewards can be changed through interaction 
with the promotion system.  As a participant on both sides of the evaluation (rater 
and ratee), an individual is aware of interactions of various subsystems within the 
greater evaluation system. 
 People, more importantly, are not a static subsystem within the evaluation 
system, but make dynamic choices based on their culture and value system, their 
location within the structure of the organization, and their understanding of the 
importance of interaction between various subsystems.  Their dynamic choices, 
and how they relate to inflation, are further explored in Chapter IV.   
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III. SERVICE-SPECIFIC EVALUATION AND PROMOTION 
SYSTEMS 
While there are many similarities in the subsystems of the evaluation 
system in each military service (such as the overarching structure, culture, 
people, and reward systems), the services are given the freedom to decide how 
to evaluate and promote within their individual services.  This chapter briefly 
discuses evaluation theory and then lays out the formal and informal processes 
that each service uses in its respective evaluation and promotion systems, along 
with the specific tools and tasks used to accomplish them. 
The systems covered only affect officers from the grades of O–1 to O–6.  
Evaluations and promotions above this grade can be subject to different 
procedures. In addition, exceptions to procedures are not detailed.  The 
structures and tasks detailed are standard operations.   
A. EVALUATION THEORY 
Evaluation theory has been investigated throughout the history of service 
evaluation renovations.  The purpose of this research is not to evaluate the 
individual forms with respect to evaluation theory, but rather, to show how 
elements of evaluation theory (and how they are implemented) affect the 
decision to inflate. 
Evaluations, or performance measures, support the organization’s HRM or 
human resource (HR) activities.  These activities include providing feedback, 
allocating rewards, maintaining the HR system, and creating documentation as 
justification for further actions, such as promotion or discharges (Milkovich & 
Boudreau, 1994, p. 166; Syllogistics, 1987, p. III-3).  While Syllogistics (1987) 
assessed that civilian organizations were primarily using performance appraisals 
for compensation, counseling, and training development, and not for promotion, 
manpower planning, or retention/discharge decisions, performance appraisals 
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are very much core to the military system of promotion, manpower planning, and 
retention/discharge decisions (in conjunction with the promotion system). 
Theoretically, any system of evaluation should meet certain criteria, if only 
to establish legitimacy.  A system should be valid; what a system evaluates and 
what it is used for should be congruent.  If an evaluation is used for promotion, it 
should be able to evaluate indicators that are most likely to predict success in 
subsequent levels of responsibility.  If the evaluation is used to document desired 
performance, then the tool should include elements of the desired performance.  
For example, if teamwork is desired, but individual effort is evaluated and 
rewarded, individuals will do what is evaluated and rewarded vice what is desired 
(Kerr, 1995, p.12). 
According to evaluation theory, a system should be reliable; the system 
should provide consistent measures of what is being evaluated.  Given a specific 
skill or characteristic, with little variation, an evaluation should be consistent if 
rated multiple times by the same individual or across multiple individuals.   
A system should be acceptable; it should be accepted by both the raters 
and the ratees, and it should be congruent with the culture of the organization.  If 
military culture breeds people whose perception is that of excellence, then an 
evaluation system that uses a forced distribution—placing people in “average” or 
“below average” categories—may not be accepted.  More importantly, the 
perception may be that anyone who receives an “average” rating is not 
competitive for promotion.  
Finally, a system should be practical.  It should be easy to implement, 
administer, maintain, and not be excessive in either cost or time (Syllogistics, 
1987). 
Evaluations can measure a large number of variables such as skills, 
abilities, traits, behaviors, or results.  What it evaluates depends on the purpose 
of the evaluation (promotion or compensation) and the organization’s stated 
goals.  Due to the diverse nature of the jobs in the military, an appropriate 
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method of evaluation for one unit or occupation may be inappropriate for another.  
Because of the centralized structure of the military, officers of different specialties 
are often evaluated against one another.  The military is “forced” to use a 
standardized form to facilitate this process.  Unfortunately, finding a form that is 
optimal for all may not be feasible. 
There are various methods of evaluation, each having their own 
advantages, disadvantages, optimum environments, and each susceptible to 
misuse or abuse.  They will only briefly be described, but more information can 
be found in the abundance of evaluation literature.  Methods can be categorized 
as objective, subjective, or other (Milkovich & Boudreau, 1994; Syllogistics, 
1987).  Objective methods rely on direct measures to evaluate a person 
(Syllogistics, 1987, p. III-8).  Objective methods are not supposed to be 
influenced by feelings or interpretations, but rather, based on facts.  They are 
most useful in situations related to production, profits, or other repetitive jobs 
where individuals can be evaluated against quantifiable details, such as 
production numbers or profit measures.  It is a useful tool for current 
performance, but does not necessarily predict future performance or potential.  
Objective methods are generally not appropriate for a majority of officer 
evaluations based on typical officer responsibilities. 
Subjective methods rely on the judgment or opinion of the evaluator 
(Syllogistics, 1987, p. III-8).  While those judgments or opinions may be partially 
based on objective measures, the evaluation relies on the rater’s perception of 
the ratee in a broader sense.  Especially when using subjective methods, training 
of evaluators is important to ensure the correct use of the tool.  Subjective 
methods include (Milkovich & Boudreau, 1994; Syllogistics, 1987): 
 Rating scales: characteristics or traits are scored on some 
graphic scale 
 Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scales (BARS): a more 
specific offshoot of rating scales where examples of 
behaviors are given for each rating to reduce ambiguity of 
the meaning of specific words such as “average,” “excellent,” 
or “outstanding” 
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 Checklists: lists of behavioral statements that are “checked” 
if observed by the evaluator 
 Forced distribution: evaluators are forced to rate employees 
in fixed “bins” such as “below average,” “average,” or 
“excellent” 
 Ranking:  evaluator must rank employees from top to bottom 
based on some criterion 
 Essay:  evaluator writes an essay (or bullet points) about an 
employee’s performance 
Other methods include management by objective (MBO) and 360° 
evaluations.  MBO and 360° feedback® can both be considered subjective 
methods as they do rely on rater perception of a ratee or a ratee’s 
accomplishments.  MBO is a goal oriented management tool that establishes 
individual goals (a contract, if you will) for each employee, against which they are 
later evaluated.  It is highly useful for development and assessment of strengths 
and weaknesses, but very limited in use for promotion, as it does not provide 
performance indicators (Syllogistics, 1987).   
Edwards and Ewen (1996) describe 360° feedback®1 evaluations as a 
way to incorporate evaluations from all levels around an employee, using his/her 
subordinates, peers, and supervisors.  This process was developed in order to 
counter perceived supervisor-only evaluation problems such as biases; politics, 
favoritism, and friendship relationships between evaluator and employee; the 
unwillingness of supervisors to confront or disclose poor performance on 
evaluations; and the difference between supervisor’s preferences and abilities 
when completing evaluations, especially when promotion or pay decisions are 
centralized.  Overall, supervisor-only evaluations tend to be inflated, show less 
distinction among criteria, and show less distinction among people.  When 
adding in a second level (above direct supervisor) to the evaluations, the second 
level evaluation was less accurate as compared with other respondents.  
Edwards and Ewen (1996) provide a comprehensive study on the benefits of 
                                            
1 360° feedback® is a registered trademark of TEAMS, Inc. 
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360° evaluations, and effectively counter the arguments against using them only 
for development and not advancement or pay decisions, and counter the 
argument of these systems as time consuming and susceptible to inflation.  As 
with all the systems discussed, proper implementation with appropriate controls 
to mitigate disadvantages are needed in order to have an effective system.  





Rating  Evaluates against standards  Shows variation  Subject to inflation and biases 
BARS 
 Evaluates against standards 
 Shows variation 
 Optimum when specifically 
tailored to homogenous groups 
 Subject to inflation and biases 
 Expensive to develop 
Checklist 
 Shows presence or absence of 
traits/characteristics 
 Ability to weight 
traits/characteristics 




 Recognizes high and low 
performers 
 Does not account for abnormal or 
skewed distributions 
 Difficult with small groups 
 May conflict with culture of 
organization 
Ranking  Recognizes high and low performers 
 Sends a “competitive” message 
to employees (may be counter-
culture) 
 Not useful for comparing across 
diverse groups 
Essay 
 Does not constrain rater 
 Good observation capabilities 
 Good in dynamic situations or 
occupations 
 Depends on writer’s ability 
 Depends on what rater deems 
important 
 Difficult to compare across 
groups 
MBO 
 Good in dynamic situations or 
occupations  
 Promotes rater/ratee interaction 
 Does not highlight performance 
indicators 
 Difficult to compare across 
groups 
360° 
 Multiple perspectives on an 
individual 
 Less prone to inflation 
 May be time consuming/costly to 
implement 
 Perceived usurpation of 
supervisors responsibilities 
Table 2.   Summary and Comparison of Subjective Performance Assessment 
Techniques 
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No one specific method is used exclusively in the military (service-specific) 
evaluation systems.  Each service has, over time, experimented with many of the 
methods described.  Not every change was due to inflation, but many were.  The 
next section analyzes each service system to look at specific strategies, 
structure, tasks (formal and informal processes), and tools (the evaluation form) 
to illustrate interactions between subsystems within the evaluation system. 
B. USAF 
Daft (1998, p. 46) describes an organization’s goals as where it wants to 
go and its strategy as to how it gets there.  The goal of the USAF officer 
evaluation system (OES) (USAF, 2005) is threefold: to provide feedback to 
officers regarding what is expected, how well they are performing, and how to 
perform better in the future; to provide a “reliable, long-term, cumulative record of 
performance and potential based on that performance” (p. 6); and to provide 
promotion boards sound information on which to base promotion decisions.  The 
strategy used to accomplish these goals is through a system of formal structures 
and processes, informal practices, and task accomplishment. 
While this section describes current AF structures, processes, and tools, 
the concept for the system has effectively remained the same over the history of 
the AF.  The purpose of looking at these elements is to identify characteristics 
that contribute to the inflation of evaluations. 
1. Officer Evaluation System (OES) 
The OES is made up of three distinct formal processes: feedback, 
performance reports, and promotion recommendations.  Supervisors (raters) 
accomplish these processes on the people they supervise (ratees).  First time 
supervisors are required to receive training in the processes within 60 days of 
entering into a supervisory position (USAF, 2005).  Refresher training is at the 
discretion of the installation commander.  Per AFI, training is required; whether or 
not training is accomplished is not necessarily scrutinized. 
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Feedback is accomplished in accordance with AFI 36–2406, Officer and 
Enlisted Evaluation Systems (USAF, 2005) and is documented using the AF form 
724 (AF724 – Performance Feedback Worksheet [PFW]).  This form is a guide to 
facilitate communication between the rater and ratee.  The AF724 does not 
become an official part of any personnel records and is designed to create a 
permissive opportunity to frankly discuss expectations, progress, and to make 
further recommendations (career counseling).  Per AFI 36–2406 (USAF, 2005), 
Lieutenants through Captains (O–1 – O–3) are required to received initial, 
midterm, and follow up feedback (following a performance report); Majors 
through Lieutenant Colonels (O–4 – O–5) are required to receive initial and 
midterm feedback; and Colonels (O–6) are only required to receive initial 
feedback counseling.  The OES training guide (HQ AFPC/DPSIDE, 2009), 
however, states that Colonels will also receive follow up feedback.   
Feedback sessions are mandatory, but non-accomplishment of feedback 
does not invalidate subsequent evaluations or promotion recommendations.  The 
rater’s rater ensures the rater accomplishes feedback in accordance with the AFI 
and backs up the rater in the event the rater is unable to accomplish it.  The 
actual feedback form is a combination of essay and rating scale system of 
evaluation. 
Officer Performance Reports (OPRs) are also accomplished in 
accordance with AFI 36–2406 (USAF, 2005) and are documented on the AF form 
707 (AF707, see Appendix).  This form recently changed from the AF707A/B to 
AF707.  The essence of the form has remained the same since 1988; the AF707 
reduced the length of the evaluation form and decreased the number of areas to 
be graded “meets standards” or “does not meet standards” from six to one.  
OPRs are accomplished annually, unless a change of job or position requires an 
additional OPR be accomplished.  The 12–month cycle is individual to each 
officer; there is no mass reporting timeline. 
Colonels and below are evaluated using the AF707, unless they are a 
student in training or attending a school that lasts longer than 20 weeks.  In those 
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cases, a training report (TR) takes the place of the OPR and evaluates the 
officer’s performance with respect to the course(s) accomplished. 
The AF707 is an essay form of evaluation.  The rater is required to provide 
information on the ratee, using all available sources.  The rater is required to 
annotate certain information (such as convictions), recommended to annotate 
other information (such as adverse actions, like an Article 15), and cannot use 
the form for promotion or award recommendations, assignment, or professional 
military education (PME) recommendations inappropriate to rank.  In addition, 
comments relating to developmental education, advanced degrees, or 
information regarding events that occurred outside the timeframe evaluated 
cannot be documented. 
The OPR process has three (potentially two) evaluators administering the 
evaluation: the rater, additional rater, and senior rater (or reviewer).  The rater is 
generally the immediate supervisor and must be an officer of equal or higher rank 
than the ratee.  The additional rater is generally the rater’s rater and must be of 
equal or higher rank than the rater and of higher rank than the ratee.  The senior 
rater (or reviewer) is the senior rating position for the organization.  AFI 36–2406 
(USAF, 2005) states that the “reviewer is the primary quality control level and 
guards against inaccuracy and exaggeration” (p. 48). 
Ratees should not write their own OPRs, but should provide information to 
the rater to enable him/her to accurately write the evaluation.  The rater is 
responsible for writing the bulk of the evaluation.  The rater generally provides a 
complete document (draft) for the additional rater.  The additional rater makes 
changes, as desired.  The senior rater does not put in any comments if he/she 
concurs with the evaluation, but may non-concur and place additional comments.  
The ratee is required to sign the OPR to complete the evaluation cycle.  This is a 
recent change with the new AF707 form; the previous form did not require a 
ratee’s signature and the rater was not supposed to show the OPR to the ratee 
until it became a part of official records. 
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Especially with an essay form of evaluation, there are robust informal 
processes in play.  The first thing to note is that “records get promoted, not 
people.”  Based on this premise, evaluators understand that in addition to being 
an annual record of accomplishment, records must be competitive at the central 
selection board if they feel that officer should be promoted, and consequently, be 
allowed to continue in the military.  If an outsider were to read some USAF officer 
evaluations, they might conclude that most all officers “cure cancer and walk on 
water” based on the words used.  This is obviously not the case and the way 
officers are differentiated is through informal processes (anonymous, personal 
communication, October 23, 2009).   
To indicate a top officer, stratification (ranking amongst a set or subset of 
individuals [Milkovich & Boudreau, 1994, p. 177]) and/or command 
recommendations are given.  For average officers, the presence or absence of a 
PME recommendation indicates where in the average group one stands.  As 
stratification is seen as a discriminator, officers are taught to find some way to be 
able to discriminate their subordinates.  This is effectively “creative stratification.”  
Obviously, “my #1 of 50 CGOs” is more impressive than “#1 of 10 LTs,” but 
based on how OPRs are used in the promotion process, the implication of 
stratification can affect board members’ perceptions.   The central board must 
process many records and make decisions in a limited amount of time.  Just like 
any other time saving measure, certain items stand out and are “eye-catchers” 
for decision-making.  HQ AFPC/DPSIDE’s OES training guide (2009) gives 
examples on stratification: “there are several recognized levels of stratification 
used by raters to convey the relative strength of an officer” (p.12).  For example, 
the top is “my #1 of 12…finest officer I’ve ever known” and the lowest, 
“outstanding officer” (p. 12).  This is an example of how officers are “educated” in 
inflation and an existing system of informal processes. 
Certain words (such as “superstar” or “self-starter” or “mastermind”) are 
used to subtly indicate ranking without numbers.  Unfortunately, word 
implications change over time based on overuse or the perception of the rater or 
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promotion board.  Evaluations are written to ensure no “white space” in the 
comment blocks.  “White space” implies the ratee did not accomplish enough or 
was not deserving enough to warrant a filled block.  OPR comments are written 
in bullet format.  Most bullets are “top-level” (main) bullets.  Too many sub-bullets 
(secondary or expounding) imply the ratee did not have enough different 
accomplishments about which to write (anonymous, personal communication, 
October 23, 2009). 
Especially with the preceding form and the amount of comments required, 
raters focused on the first and last lines of each block, knowing the promotion 
board has limited time to review records.  If there are no hard-hitting bullets in 
those two lines, it implies something to the promotion board, even if there are 
superior comments in between. 
Informally, ratees often provide raters with a complete draft OPR in 
addition to a list of accomplishments.  This may be done to reduce the workload 
for the supervisor and give the ratee practice in writing OPRs.  Through this 
process, junior officers can be mentored by their raters as to how an OPR should 
be written.  This is often where training really happens, as opposed to formal 
training. 
In addition to the words on a form, the person signing a form is a 
significant informal factor from a promotion board’s perspective.  A Maj Gen as a 
rater carries a lot more weight than a LtCol as a rater.  This fact influences 
supervisors to strategically place individuals in jobs based on the resultant 
evaluation. 
The final formal process in the OES is the promotion recommendation.  
This, too, is governed by AFI 36–2406 (USAF, 2005) and documented on the 
promotion recommendation form (PRF), AF form 709 (AF709).  The PRF is a 
summary of career highlights as pulled from all OPRs, using 10 lines of text.  
While current events carry greater weight, performance over time is also 
important.  This form is only used for promotion and is destroyed after the officer 
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meets the scheduled promotion board.  The senior rater completes PRFs for 
every officer scheduled to meet a specific promotion board.  The informal 
practices and politics are the same as with the OPR, such as “no wasted space” 
and stratification.  Creative stratification is less used on PRFs as the senior rater 
is providing the promotion board his/her final ranking of all the officers meeting 
that promotion board in the organization.  This is, in effect, a “mass reporting” for 
all officers of a specific rank meeting a promotion board. 
The senior rater makes a final overall promotion recommendation: 
definitely promote (DP), promote (P), or do not promote this board (DNP).  DPs 
are allocated to a senior rater based on total promotion opportunities and the 
number of officers a senior rater has for that promotion board.  This process of 
DP allocations is a bureaucratic, standardized process.  A senior rater with few 
officers up for promotion may not receive any DPs and may be required to attend 
a management level review (MLR) board to compete for DPs.  MLRs are 
allocated DPs, receive “left-over” DPs from organizations due to “rounding 
errors,” and acquire DPs not used by various organizations. 
Once PRFs are completed, they are submitted, along with the officer’s 
complete record, to the promotion board for consideration.  The following section 
details the formal promotion process. 
2. Promotion Process 
As was detailed in the description of the larger military organization, each 
service uses its own process to determine who will be promoted to the next rank.  
The AF divides up its force into competitive categories to dictate who competes 
against whom for promotion.  The AF has “line of the AF” (LAF) and non-line 
officers.  Non-line officers are judge advocates (JAG), chaplains (HC), medical 
corps (MC), dental corps (DC), nurse corps (NC), biomedical science corps 
(BSC), and medical service corps (MSC).  Each of the non-line categories 
competes within itself.  LAF officers are everyone else; logisticians, pilots, 
maintenance officers, etc., all compete against each other.  While there is 
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specificity to each of those fields, these officers are seen as generalists and can 
compete for a variety of positions.  They have mobility outside their narrow niche. 
The purpose of the promotion program is to provide a stable, consistent, 
visible promotion pattern for all competitive categories, ensure the best officers 
are promoted, and allow for accelerated promotion for those with exceptional 
potential (USAF, 1997, p. 1; USAF, 2004, p. 12).  Congress and the Secretaries 
determine the required force strengths and each service individually determines 
how many and how often to hold promotion boards in order to meet the 
respective requirements.  An officer is considered for promotion once he/she 
enters the promotion zone.  This zone is based on time-in-grade and the needs 
of the AF.  Second Lieutenants are promoted at 2 years time-in-grade.  First 
Lieutenants are also promoted at 2 years time-in-grade, without regard to 
vacancies.  Once an officer reaches the rank of Captain and higher, he/she is 
only promoted after being selected by a promotion board and after a vacancy in 
the next higher rank occurs.  It is an objective, standardized process. 
The promotion board is comprised of individuals in the same demographic 
spread as the makeup of the officers up for promotion.  These demographics 
include race, sex, aeronautical rating, career field, and command of assignment.  
The members of the board are “highly qualified senior officers with extensive 
experience and mature judgment” (USAF, 1997, p.10).  The promotion board 
considers the following documents in order to make promotion decisions:  OPRs, 
PRFs, TRs, letters of evaluation (similar to OPRs, but for a shorter time period or 
temporary duty), decorations, specialty board certification (non-line), officer 
selection brief (factual data on an officer’s career up to that point), any letters to 
the board from the officer up for promotion, and any courts martial orders or 
adverse actions (article 15, letter of reprimand, etc.) taken on the officer.   
Promotion is not a reward for past performance, but rather a recognition of 
the potential to serve in the next highest grade.  The board is directed to look at 
the “whole person” in order to make the decision.  The factors they consider are 
job performance, leadership (based on previous positions/jobs held), professional 
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qualities (expertise [depth] in the officer’s specific field), breadth of experience 
(especially for higher ranks), job responsibility, academic and professional 
military education, and specific achievements (awards, decorations, special 
recognition, etc.). 
The board members “score” each officer’s record based on a scale of 6–
10, with 6 being below average and 10 being outstanding.  Board member 
training consists of conducting trial runs with a representative sample of 
packages until they can all achieve similar scores for each package.  Based on 
the number of officers considered for promotion during a promotion board, the 
board members may be divided into panels to score a subset of the total records.  
The sub-group must be demographically representative, and the subset of 
records must be relatively equal in numbers, equal in promotion recommendation 
distribution, and be representative of the quality of the records meeting the 
board.  If the board members are divided into panels, they will only score the 
records for that panel and will not see all the records meeting the promotion 
board. 
The board members then score all packages for promotion through secret 
ballot.  Each package receives a total score.  The records are listed in order from 
highest to lowest and, based on the number of allocations for promotion, officers 
are selected for promotion, starting from the top.  Where record scores are tied 
for consideration for promotion, they are sent back to the board members to re-
score for further differentiation.  The officers selected will either promote 
immediately upon release of board results (Lieutenants) or when vacancies arise 
(Captain and above).   
Per discussion with the Air Force Board Secretariat (anonymous, personal 
communication, October 23, 2009), there is no average time spent reviewing 
records.  While the magnitude may be daunting (for example,  approximately 
6,000 records to be reviewed and scored by 25 officers over the span of 3 
weeks), they are directed to take as much, or as little, time as is necessary in 
order to accurately score the record.  While there is no set amount of time, the 
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magnitude of the task guarantees that informal processes will be relied on to 
conquer the task.  As was mentioned in the OPR and PRF sections, informal 
practices such as no white space, stratification, and hard-hitting bullets on the 
first and last line are all taken into account by the board members.  If there is a 
lot of wasted space (white space), that gives an “impression” to a board member.  
Stratification, no stratification, and type of stratification implies something.  Board 
members tend to read the “opening line” and “closing line” of OPRs and PRFs to 
get an overall impression.  These informal practices mean one can inflate an 
OPR or PRF and yet still send a “message” to the promotion board about the 
officer. 
C. USA 
The Army, too, must evaluate its officers and make promotion decisions.  
1. Evaluation Reporting System (ERS) 
The purpose of the Army ERS is twofold: to provide information to the 
Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), to make personnel management 
decisions (such as school selection, promotions, and assignments) and to 
professionally develop their leaders and improve mission accomplishment (USA, 
2007).  These two objectives are supported by the Officer Evaluation Report 
(OER - DA FORM 67–9), the Officer Evaluation Support Form (DA FORM 67–9–
1), and the Developmental Support Form (DA FORM 67–9–1a, for junior officers 
only). 
The rating chain consists of the ratee, the rater, and the senior rater.  
Occasionally, there is an intermediate rater, but that is not the standard.  The 
rater is normally the immediate supervisor and is normally senior in rank or date 
of rank of the ratee.  The senior rater must be senior to the ratee and is generally 
the rater’s rater. 
The Army focuses greatly in their SOPs on the importance of formal 
feedback and counseling in their formal processes.  The support and 
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developmental support forms are filled out in coordination with the rater and the 
ratee at the beginning of the evaluation period.  Officers are required at least an 
initial counseling session with their rater, with follow on sessions mandatory for 
younger officers.  In effect, the support form and the developmental forms are a 
form of “management by objective.”  The ratee is required to participate in setting 
goals, determining duties and responsibilities, and determining major 
performance objectives.  The form is also used by the ratee to annotate what 
he/she accomplished over the rating period in order to help the rater fill out the 
evaluation form. 
While the support form and development form do not become a part of 
permanent military records, the rating chain uses it to facilitate evaluation 
completion.  The promotion board does not see these feedback and counseling 
forms. 
The evaluation period for an Army officer is roughly annually.  There are 
exceptions to the “rule” due to schools, amount of time supervised, and failure to 
select for promotion, but in general, an Army officer can expect one evaluation 
per year, on an individual time cycle (no mass reporting). 
The OER (see Appendix) is a combination of subjective essay and 
standards accomplishment (checklist).  The rater determines if the ratee has 
demonstrated successful accomplishment of Army values and leader attributes, 
skills, and action (standards).  These are a “yes” or “no” selection.  Any “no” 
requires the ratee to acknowledge the rating and allows the ratee an opportunity 
to supply evidence refuting the rating.  The rater then fills out various sections in 
essay form, relying heavily on objectives developed and information included on 
the support form.  The rater also makes a recommendation on the promotion 
potential of the officer (“must promote,” “promote,” “do not promote,” or “other”) 
directly on the evaluation form. There are no limits as to how many “must 
promotes,” “promotes,” or “do not promotes” a rater is allowed to give. 
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AR623–3 (USA, 2007) states that any negative ratings or comments must 
be referred back to the ratee for acknowledgement and opportunity for rebuttal.  
Comments in the essay sections must only cover the established rating period.  
Comments must also refrain from “excessive or exaggerated” phrases, trite 
comments without substantiation, bullet sentences, the use of type fonts to 
highlight information, and making any reference to the boxes selected in other 
areas of the form.   
The senior rater also uses the support form in conjunction with writing the 
evaluation.  The senior rater must evaluate the ratee’s promotion potential (“best 
qualified,” “fully qualified,” “do not promote,” or “other”) on the evaluation form, 
comment on the ratee’s performance and potential, and then must compare the 
ratee with other officers of the same grade. There are no limits as to the number 
of “best qualified,” “fully qualified,” or “do not promotes” a senior rater may give.  
Due to previous inflation issues (Hamilton, 2002), the Army instituted a restriction 
as to the number of “above center of mass” (ACOMs) evaluations in the potential 
section (part VII.b.) a senior rater could select. 
A senior rater is limited to less than 50% ACOM rankings.  This is 
managed by a “profile” that is kept on a senior rater at HQDA.  This profile is 
permanent for a senior rater, unless a request for “reset” is approved, whereby a 
senior rater’s profile is wiped out and reset to zero.  A senior rater is required to 
manage his/her own profile to ensure an ACOM ranking is not submitted to 
HQDA when one is not available in his/her profile.  If done, a “misfire” is 
generated; the senior rater is given the opportunity to correct the error; if the error 
is not corrected, a disciplinary letter is sent to the senior rater’s senior rater (USA, 
2007, p. 27).  Once an evaluation is sent up to HQDA, section VII.b.’s selection is 
compared to the senior rater’s profile and a computer generated value is 
overprinted on the evaluation.  If an ACOM is selected but no ACOM is available, 
a center of mass (COM) value is overprinted, regardless of the selection of the 
senior rater.  ACOM/COM rankings are only done on Majors or above (not LTs or 
CAPTs).  Army evaluations are shown to the ratee after completion. 
 41
As with the USAF, there are elements of informal processes occurring 
during evaluation completion.  Based on an interview with a senior Army officer 
(anonymous, personal communication, October 29, 2009), the following informal 
processes and elements of inflation are present.  While the senior Army officer 
did say the form is considerably less inflated compared to the previous system, 
inflation is still present.  Both the rater and the senior rater “must” give the “must 
promote” and “best qualified” ratings when evaluating. Not selecting these sends 
a very strong (negative) message to the promotion board, even though the 
options of “promote” and “fully qualified” do not sound very negative. 
In addition, the write-ups in sections V.b. and VII.c. have a tendency to be 
“flowery and inflated” (anonymous, personal communication, October 29, 2009).  
Similar to the USAF, stratification and recommendations for command 
differentiate the best officers from the good officers, regardless of their actual 
promotion recommendation or potential (ACOM/COM) score.  The issue of “white 
space” is not an informal process in the USA.  Less (well written) is considered 
better, as opposed to using all available space for comments.  As will be shown 
in the USA promotion process, the board has a daunting task of evaluating many 
officers for promotion, and so, comments by the rater are often not reviewed, 
instead, focusing on the comments of the senior rater. 
Because of the limit on ACOM ratings, a senior rater must manage his/her 
own profile.  This is especially daunting at the onset of a senior rater’s evaluation 
history.  In reality, in the first four officers a senior rater rates, only one is allowed 
to get an ACOM rating.  This is non-negotiable.  At HQDA, an ACOM rating can 
be overturned to a COM rating.  In these cases, the senior rater relies on the 
informal processes of stratification and command recommendations to indicate to 
the board their inability to give the rating desired.  Additionally, as previously 
discussed, some senior raters may choose to use those ACOM ratings to give 




officer they feel truly deserves the ACOM rating (Hamilton, 2002).  This informal 
process is based on the senior rater’s philosophy and is not standardized across 
the service.  
2. Promotion Process 
The Army is also given leeway to promote its officers as it desires, and 
manages that system in accordance with AR 600–8–29 (USA, 2005).  As with the 
AF, the Army uses a centralized promotion system.  Officers are considered for 
promotion based on their active date of rank and time-in-grade (TIG).  TIG 
requirements range from 18 months (2LT) to 3 years (CAPT, MAJ, and LTCOL).  
First Lieutenants must serve 2 years and Colonels must serve 1 year. Officers 
are promoted according to seniority (once they are selected for promotion). 
Boards are convened as required to recommend officers for promotion to 
the next higher grade in accordance with U.S. codes.  A separate board is 
convened for each competitive category and each separate rank.  The Army has 
10 competitive categories: Army, Chaplains, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, 
Medical Service Corps, Army Medical Specialist Corps, Veterinary Corps, Army 
Nurse Corps, Medical Corps, Dental Corps, and Warrant Officer Corps.  A 
majority of officers reside in the “Army” competitive category.  A promotion board 
must be comprised of at least 5 officers, of which one must be of the same 
competitive category as that which is being reviewed.  Board members must be 
at least a Major in rank, and must be of a higher rank than those considered. 
The Secretary of the Army submits a memo of instruction to the board to 
communicate his/her guidance for the board.  The memo details the oath to be 
taken by the board members, any reports required, the method of selection, any 
factors (such as the Army’s need in certain functional, branch, or skill areas) to 
be considered, the maximum number of officers to be selected (of which 10% [or 
up to 15%] of the numbers may be taken from below the primary zone), and any 
other supplemental information.   The board receives the following items for each 
officer considered:  performance records of the official military personnel file, 
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authorized documents that have not been filed, officer record brief, an official 
photograph, and any correspondence from the officer.  Anything not part of 
official documentation on an officer is prohibited from the board.  
The board promotes officers based on an impartial look at each officer’s 
records.  Boards select for promotion via two methods:  fully qualified and best 
qualified.  The fully qualified method is used when the number of officers up for 
promotion consideration is equal to the maximum number of officers authorized 
for promotion.   This is often the case for the junior ranks of 2LT and 1LT.  The 
best qualified method is used when there are more officers available for 
promotion consideration than the number allowed for promotion.  In this case, the 
board must determine who will or will not be recommended for promotion. 
For the junior ranks of Second and First Lieutenant, a promotion board 
may not even convene, based on the intent to promote via the fully qualified 
method.  Officers’ records are screened for any unfavorable attributes, such as 
courts martial or other negative issues.  Boards for junior officers may be 
convened in cases where the Army is directed to reduce its forces strength, as 
was done in FY1994.  LTs that were not selected for promotion were separated 
in accordance with applicable U.S. codes. 
Board members receive a brief on the overall board processes and then 
conduct a mock promotion board to ensure members are consistent in their 
grading of officer records.  Each board member views every record and assigns 
a score to it.  On average, a board member spends about 30 seconds – 1 minute 
reviewing a record.  Based on the amount of time available, board members 
predominately look for “left side” promotion recommendations (“must promote” 
and “best qualified”), first two and last two lines of the senior rater’s comments, 
potential rating (ACOM/COM), the individual’s picture, and the importance of the 
jobs held during the career (anonymous, personal communication, October 29, 
2009). 
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The scores are aggregated and officers are listed in order based on those 
aggregate scores.  Based on the number of officers allowed to be promoted and 
based on specific direction from the Secretary as to strengths in each functional 
area, officers are selected for promotion.   
D. USN 
The purpose of the Navy evaluation system is to maintain records on 
naval personnel “which reflect their fitness for the service and performance of 
duties” (USN, 2008, p. I-1) and which are used for career actions such as 
promotion, training, specialization, and duty assignments.  The Navy states 
“timely, realistic, and accurate reports are essential for each of these tasks” 
(USN, 2008, p. I-1).  
1. Evaluation System 
The Navy evaluation system includes two main processes: feedback 
counseling and performance evaluation.  Both are accomplished in accordance 
with BUPERSINST 1610.10B (USN, 2008) and are documented on the Navy’s 
Fitness Report (FITREP) form (NAVPERS 1610/2) (see Appendix).   
Feedback sessions (performance counseling) are used to “enhance 
professional growth, encourage personal development, and improve 
communication” (USN, 2008, p. 19-1).  Counseling is scheduled at the midway 
point in an evaluation period and at the completion of an evaluation.  This 
counseling (feedback) session is accomplished by the immediate supervisor or 
the reporting senior.   
The rating chain for officers includes the ratee and the reporting senior.  
The reporting senior is normally the officer in charge or the commander of an 
organization.  While the ratee’s immediate supervisor is involved in constructing 
the FITREP, he/she does not have a separate section for comments and only 
signs stating a feedback session was accomplished.  Navy regular FITREPs are 
done en masse, based on rank.  With a few exceptions, officers receive a 
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FITREP at the same time each year, along with their peers.  For example, all O–
2s (LTJGs) receive their FITREPs in February; all O–3s (LTs) receive their 
FITREPs in January; and all O–6s (CAPTs) receive their FITREPs in July. 
The FITREP form is a combination of essay and BARS evaluation.  Seven 
character traits are marked based on demonstrated performance, with a 
performance trait grade of “3” being “performance to full Navy standards” (USN, 
2008, p. 2).  FITREP comments should be concise; should not use flowery 
language; should quantify performance, but not at the expense of quality; should 
differentiate officers from one another; and should be consistent with trait grades.  
Required, suggested, and prohibited comments are similar to the other services. 
Officers are given an opportunity to comment on reports that are considered 
“adverse.”   
Promotion recommendations are integral to the FITREP and do not 
depend on promotion eligibility.  The senior rater may give a promotion 
recommendation of “Significant Problems” (a recommendation against 
promotion), “Progression” (a recommendation neither for nor against promotion), 
“Promotable,” “Must Promote,” and “Early Promote.”  As with the AF, the Navy 
limits the number of strong positive promotion recommendations (“Must Promote” 
and “Early Promote”) through a bureaucratic, standardized process.  The 
combination of “Must Promotes” and “Early Promotes” must not exceed 50% for 
O–4s or 40% for O–5/6s.  Of those numbers, only 20% may be “Early Promotes.”  
There are no limits for O–3s.  O–1/2s (except for limited-duty officers) may only 
receive a promotion recommendation of “Promotable.”  With small groups, there 
will always be at least one “Must Promote” and one “Early Promote,” regardless 
of percentages.   
The USN has four competitive categories (unrestricted line [URL], 
restricted line, staff, and limited duty officer).  Within the staff and restricted line 
categories, subcategories exist called designators. An officer’s FITREP is written 
in comparison with other officers in the same competitive category and same 
designation, called “summary groups.”   
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Each FITREP includes an average of the summary group’s scores to 
show the officer’s ranking among peers for that evaluation period under the 
specific reporting senior.  This summary includes trait average and a summary of 
promotion recommendation allocations.  An additional summary letter is created 
showing each officer’s scores and the reporting senior’s average (reporting 
senior’s profile).  All FITREPS within a specific summary group are mailed 
together to the Navy Personnel Command (NAVPERSCOM) for processing and 
inclusion into each officer’s permanent records.  Officers sign their FITREP and 
receive a copy of it when complete. 
An interview with a senior Navy officer was conducted to highlight any 
inflation and any informal processes present in the Navy evaluation system 
(anonymous, personal communication, October 29, 2009).  The senior officer 
stated that the system is not as inflated as it used to be due to the introduction of 
the reporting senior’s profile.  The reporting senior’s profile allows a promotion 
board to easily view the relative score of an individual vs. the senior rater’s 
average scores.   
Because of the profile and the need of a senior rater to manage his/her 
profile, informal practices have emerged to supplement the formal processes.  As 
with both the USAF and the USA, “soft breakouts” (stratification) are used to 
differentiate top officers from average officers, regardless of the actual scores.  
There is also the difference between stratification inside a competitive category 
vs. across competitive categories (#1 of 10 officers vs. #1 of 3 PAO officers), with 
one sending a stronger message to the board.  “White space” is not considered 
an issue in Navy FITREPs.   
Based on promotion board processes, reporting seniors will adjust 
evaluations to depict certain things to a board.  New officers (to a reporting 
senior) are often given lower grades to help keep the reporting senior’s profile 




FITREP (to show progression).  Certain traits are considered strategic levelers to 
adjust overall scores, such as command climate/equal opportunity and military 
bearing. 
Regardless of the number of officers to be evaluated, a reporting senior 
always has at least one “must promote” and one “early promote.”  If that reporting 
senior does not use those allocations (“air gap”), it sends a strong (negative) 
message to the promotion board.  For example, if a reporting senior rates one 
LCDR and only gives that officer a “must promote” instead of an “early promote,” 
the board interprets it as a downgrade, not as a “must promote.”  
2. Promotion Process 
The Navy convenes boards to recommend officers for promotion based on 
force strength allocations from Congress in the same manner as do the other 
services.  Board composition and rules governing board operations are set forth 
in SECNAVINST 1401.3A (USN, 2005) and SECNAVINST 1420.1B (USN, 
2006).  Officers meet promotion boards based on TIG (as is the case for the 
other services).  The Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) provides guidance to the 
board based on the needs of the service regarding competitive category numbers 
and skills needed in the next higher grade. 
Selection boards are comprised of officers of that reflect the composition 
of the officer corps (sex, racial/ethnic minorities, etc.).  Board members must be 
at least an O–4 and will be of a grade higher than the officers considered for 
promotion.  SECNAVINST 1401.3A (USN, 2005) further dictates the minimum 
number of representatives per sub-specialty that must sit on the board.  For 
example, in the unrestricted line officer promotion board, there must be five air 
warfare officers (at least one pilot and one naval flight officer), four surface 
warfare officers, three submarine officers, one special warfare officer, and one 
special operations officer.  Requirements are different for the different 
competitive categories. 
 48
Board members receive both on-line training and training once they arrive 
for the board.  Much of the training is on how to use their computer system based 
on the way they execute their promotion boards.  Records are divvyed up to 
individual board members.  Conversation with the promotion board office 
(anonymous, personal communication, October 28, 2009) revealed that board 
members could be responsible for anywhere from 50–300 records.  The board 
member becomes the officer’s advocate for promotion.  The board member 
reviews, in depth, the records and annotates information to be briefed to the 
board as a whole.  Periodically, the board members retire to the “tank” to vote on 
those records.   
The officer’s information is placed up on computer screens where all 
board members can see it.  They will see the photo, the officer summary record 
(OSR), the performance summary record (PSR), and any markups by the 
advocate.  The board members do not see the individual FITREPS; only the 
advocate actually reviews everything.  The advocate proceeds to “sell” the 
individual and each board member votes a confidence level as to whether that 
individual would be suitable in the next rank.  The confidence levels are 0%, 
25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%.  The scores are averaged and assigned to that 
record.  This is done for every record. 
Once all the records are complete, a scatter gram is shown to the board 
members and they vote on delineations to recommend for promotion and to 
exclude for promotion.  For example, they may take the officers who scored 80% 
confidence averages and above and select them for promotion.  They may 
exclude all officers who received a score of 30% and below.  The rest in the 
middle are then re-divvyed to new advocates and the process repeats until the 
quota is filled.   
In practice, an advocate has, on average, 15 minutes to review and 
markup a record.  On average, the board makes their confidence decision in 45 
seconds to 1 minute.  The board focuses on relative scores, progression of 
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scores and promotion recommendations, and any relevant comments from the 
advocate.  These focus points influence the way a senior rater writes evaluations. 
E. USMC 
While the USMC is under the Department of the Navy and reports to the 
Secretary of the Navy, it does have a different evaluation system.  The purpose 
of the USMC performance evaluation system (PES) is to provide the “primary 
means for evaluating a Marine’s performance to support the Commandant’s 
effort to select the best qualified personnel for promotion, augmentation, 
retention, resident schooling, command, and duty assignments” (USMCb, 2009, 
p. 2).  
1. Performance Evaluation System (PES) 
The USMC evaluation system is governed by MCO P1610.7F (USMCb, 
2009).  The PES, itself, does not include counseling as an integral part, but does 
reference counseling as an important part of the process that culminates in the 
evaluation.  Counseling can be accomplished via the “MRO Worksheet.”  This 
tool is used to clarify responsibilities, establish goals, and is used by the ratee to 
provide inputs to the formal evaluation.  The evaluation is record of 
accomplishment and should not be used as a counseling tool (p. 1-6).  
Marine Corps officers are trained in the PES process through access to 
the PES manual, instruction in formal schools, and unit training (USMCb, 2009, 
p. 8-5). 
Different from the other services, the USMC does not place the ratee in 
the “reporting chain.”  The reporting chain is comprised of the reporting senior 
(RS), the reviewing officer (RO), a potential third officer sighter, and the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC).  The ratee provides information to the 
reporting senior for inclusion on the evaluation, but is not as involved in the 
process as the other services.  The reporting senior is generally the next highest 
officer in the reporting chain for the ratee.   
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Throughout the regulation, the officers in the reporting chain are cautioned 
against inflating reports.  The RS is reminded that “inflated markings, patronizing 
comments, and other techniques designed to “game the system” and give the 
MRO [Marine reported on, added] an undeserved advantage over 
contemporaries are acts of misplaced loyalty and ultimately hurt the institution” 
(USMCb, 2009, p. 2-4).  The RO is generally the RS’s rater.  He/she is also 
reminded to avoid inflation and is directed to “not concur with inflated reports” (p. 
2-5).  The third officer sighting is only used in the event a report is considered 
“adverse.” 
Fitness reports are due annually at the same time each year (with Captain 
through Colonel due in May), unless another reason (such as change of reporting 
official, temporary duty, change of rank, or as directed due to unfavorable 
situations) dictates, similar to the USN. 
The evaluation tool is the form NAVMC 10835E (see Appendix) and is a 
combination of essay and BARS.  MCO 1610.7F Ch1 (USMCb, 2009) calls the 
rating scales PARS (performance anchored rating scales), but it is the same as 
BARS.  The evaluation form is the longest of all the services at five pages, not 
including any addendums.  The regulation is extremely detailed in how the form 
is to be completed, again, warning against inflation at every section.  The PARS 
section includes evaluation of 13 attributes, using a scale of “A” through “G.”  “A” 
is considered unacceptable performance and requires written justification.  “F” 
and “G” are considered exceptional performance and also require written 
justification.  “B” – “E” marks do not required written justification (and, in fact, 
justification is forbidden).  
RSs develop a grading history over time (RS profile) that allows for a 
relative value of an officer’s performance.  This is similar to the Navy and Army 
system.  This profile is a dynamic tool that cannot be reset.  The RO also 
develops a comparative assessment profile.  A master brief sheet fitness report 
listing will evaluate a ratee’s received marks in relation to the RS and RO 
profiles.  This evaluation includes the ratee’s marks vs. the profile at processing 
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(a static number/value) and the ratee’s marks vs. the RS/RO profiles at master 
brief sheet processing.  This last value is a dynamic value that continues to 
change as the RS/RO accomplishes more and more evaluations.  This influences 
consistent and accurate evaluations as evaluations today affect the relative value 
of evaluations previously accomplished and those yet to be written (USMCb, 
2009, pp. G-1 – G-3 and K-1 – K-3). 
MCO P1610.7F (USMC, 2009, pp. N-1 – N-3) also describes methods to 
identify, notify, and rectify actors in the PES that either display noteworthy 
adherence to the intent of the system or those that display undesirable reporting 
trends such as inflation, gaming, or procedural errors.  RS/ROs displaying 
undesirable trends are notified directly.  If those trends continue, their 
supervisors are notified.  This information could then become a part of the 
RS/RO’s evaluation.  Evaluations considered unduly inflated at the headquarters 
level have actually been returned to the RS/RO for re-accomplishment. 
Promotion recommendations are inherent in the evaluation form.  The RS 
makes the promotion recommendation (yes, no, or N/A) and can also make a 
recommendation for accelerated promotion.  The RO is only required to comment 
on an accelerated promotion recommendation.  There are no limits as to the 
number of promotion recommendations that can be given. 
The ratee is only required to sign an “adverse” evaluation.  Otherwise, the 
ratee receives a copy of the completed evaluation either after completion or from 
the personnel center after the evaluation has been incorporated into permanent 
records.   
An interview was conducted with a senior Marine Corps officer 
(anonymous, personal communication, October 30, 2009) to unearth any 
inflationary issues and informal processes evident in the USMC evaluation 
system.  The current evaluation form was introduced in 1998 due to extreme 
inflation in the previous system.  The senior officer commented that the current 
system overcompensated in its efforts to eliminate inflation.  The system was 
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designed with the “competent” officer receiving the second to lowest score.  This 
does not leave any “wiggle room” for profile management.  Based on this, many 
RS/ROs have developed practices that move the average ranking into the 
middle, regardless of the PARS descriptor, to allow for profile management and 
the ability to manipulate relative scores.  RS/ROs profile scores are used as part 
of their own evaluations and influence them to keep the scores under control (un-
inflated).  This is present in section H, under evaluations, with the PARS 
descriptor directly referencing evaluation inflation. 
RSs that followed the regulation to the letter would have consistently 
graded competent officers in the lower half of the available scale.  If they 
changed their method to adhere to the practice of “middle of the scale,” then they 
would penalize previous ratees with the dynamic relative score.  Based on this, 
informal training (mentorship) may teach a middle of the scoring scale system for 
profile management. 
Another informal aspect of the Marine evaluation system is the culture of 
humility and limited early promotion opportunity.  This culture seems to contribute 
to a lower rate of inflation. 
As with the other services, scores, alone, are not indicative of the whole 
person.  The RS/ROs use the directed comments sections to talk up or talk down 
an officer. There were no stigmas associated with “white space.”  While inflated 
language may be used, it was not to the same level as other services. 
2. Promotion Process 
The USMC promotion process is similar to the other services.  They have 
two major active duty officer competitive categories: unrestricted and restricted.  
Unrestricted officers are the bulk of the officers in the Marine Corps and compete 
against each other for promotion.  
The rules governing the promotion process, board member requirements, 
authorized information provided to the board, and eligibility for consideration for 
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promotion are the same as the other services, are directly governed by the same 
regulations as the USN, and are further refined by MCO P1400.31C Ch1 
(USMCa, 2009). 
The actual promotion board process is as follows.  Each officer considered 
for promotion has his/her “case” assigned to a board member.  Each board 
member reviews and prepares his/her “in-the-zone” cases to be presented to the 
board.  They then review and prepare their above- and below-the-zone cases.  
This allows the board member to gauge the “competitiveness” of above- and 
below-the-zone officers to that board.  The above- and below-the-zone cases are 
then briefed to the entire board for a vote.  If selected, which only requires one 
“yes” vote, they are considered a “premier” case and are included in the overall 
voting session for consideration for promotion.  The Marine Corps has a very 
distinct culture of not promoting early (from below-the-zone).  Since FY04, only 
one officer has been promoted below-the-zone on the Major and LtCol promotion 
boards (USMC, n.d.). 
Once all cases are ready, they are briefed to the entire promotion board.  
Each board member assigns a recommendation score (for his or her own benefit) 
to each record, and, once complete, will vote “yes” or “no” for each record.  The 
board president then sets cutoff values (similar to the Navy) as to who is selected 
and who is not selected.  For example, with 10 board members, any officer that 
receives 10 “yes” votes will be selected for promotion, and any officer that 
receives zero “yes” votes will not be selected for promotion.  That process is 
repeated until the allocation is filled or until a majority of the board considers no 
one else deserving of promotion. 
On average, a board members takes 45–90 minutes to review each 
individual record and has approximately 8–10 minutes to brief those records to 
the other board members.  On average, it only takes about 6 minutes for the 
board members to make a decision (anonymous, personal communication, 
November 3, 2009). 
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The board takes into consideration any skill sets dictated by the SECNAV 
or CMC as shortages, but is still directed to promote officers “best and fully 
qualified” (USMCa, 2009, p. 3–9) for promotion to the next highest grade.  
F. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION AND PROMOTION SYSTEMS 
Now that each service has been researched and described, so what?  
What do the tools for evaluation, the formal and informal processes, and the 
promotion systems have to do with inflation? 
Service-specific systems and relevant aspects are summarized in Table 3.
 55
   
 Air Force Army Navy Marine Corps 
System of Raters  2–3 levels  2 levels  Senior level  2 levels 
Do Ratees See/Sign 
Evaluation Form? 
 Yes; required for form 
completion 
 Only required to 
sign an adverse 
report; given a copy 
after completion 
 Yes, must sign 
when complete 
 Only required to sign 
an adverse report; given 
a copy after completion 
Competitive 
Categories  1 Large  1 Large 
 Multiple, but 1 
Large  1 Large 
Type of Evaluation 
Form  Essay 
 Essay 
 Checklist 
 Forced Distribution 
 BARS  
 Essay 
 BARS  
 Essay 
Formal Controls  None  Reporting Senior profile 
 Senior Rater 
profile 
 Reviewing Senior and 
Reviewing Officer profile 
Evaluation Timeline 
(in general)  Every 12 months  Every 12 months 
 Mass reporting 
yearly  Mass reporting yearly 
Promotion 
Recommendation 
 Separate form, 
separate process 
 Integral to 
evaluation form 
 Integral to 
evaluation form 





 Yes  No  Yes  No 
Promotion Process 
Training of Board 
Members 
 Yes 
 Practice record 
scoring 
 Yes 
 Mock board 
 Yes 




 Training on computer 
systems used 
Scoring of Records 
 Value of 6–10, rank 
ordered by score, 
selected based on 
available promotion 
slots 
 Not every board 
member sees every 
record 




Sec of Army 
 Every board 
member sees every 
record 
 Advocate method 
 Board members 
see summary of 
record 
 Vote with 
confidence level 
 Groups are 
promoted based on 
scoring divisions 
 Advocate method 
 Board members may 
see entire record 
 Vote yes/no 
 Groups are selected 
based on logical 
divisions based on 







 Word usage 
 “White space” 













 Profile Manipulation 
Table 3.    Service Specific Formal and Informal Processes Comparison 
Beginning with structure, each service has roughly two to three levels of 
supervision actually completing the evaluation.  The first level is generally the 
immediate supervisor; the second level is generally a senior officer responsible 
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for all the officers in that organization.  Each ratee is at least shown their 
evaluation, and in some cases the evaluation is not complete until the ratee signs 
it.  The cultural imperative of “looking out for your people,” the culture of loyalty 
and camaraderie, and the potential for a rater to succumb to common reasons for 
inflation (motivation, avoidance of confrontation, reward for performance, etc. 
[Longenecker & Ludwig, 1990]) are all present based on who rates and the 
interaction between the rater and ratee. 
In general, most officers are members of one large, competitive category.  
This means that they must compete for promotion against a wide variety of other 
officers in dissimilar occupations.  Evaluation theory states that each service’s 
use of essay forms of evaluation make it difficult to compare across different 
groups.  The informal processes of stratification (ranking) is also not useful for 
comparing across groups.   
The Army’s use of the checklist method prohibits identifying variation or 
levels of differentiation; however, it is an excellent way of determining the 
presence or absence of key traits or characteristics (Milkovich & Boudreau, 
1994).  In this way, it is setting a standard for minimum accomplishment, which 
may be compatible with the military culture.  The Army’s use of forced distribution 
does force the rater to identify top performers (there is no restriction on other 
categories), but does not account for abnormal or skewed distributions.  There 
may be situations where a rater does happen to supervise a group of top level 
officers.  This restriction has led to situational manipulation of rankings (Hamilton, 
2002).  This use of forced distribution was instituted based on previous levels of 
inflation. 
Both the Navy and the Marine Corps’ use of BARS are based on a set of 
standards.  This potentially allows the forms to identify differentiation or variation 
amongst officers.  While BARS can be subject to various forms of inflation or 
biases, the Navy and Marine Corps have both instituted rater profiles to allow for 
differentiation in a relative manner and to influence the rater to comply with the 
evaluation system’s intent.  The BARS system is still subject to manipulation 
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(anonymous, personal communications, October 29 & 30, 2009), but it at least 
theoretically allows for variation and can handle occasional instances of skewed 
distributions (a group of superior performing officers) if the rater has managed 
his/her profile in the past.  The forms are still subject to informal processes to 
counteract some of the restrictions placed on by the implementation of the profile 
system. 
Both the Navy and the Marine Corps use mass reporting timelines.  This 
tends to reduce inflation in the informal process of stratification, as all officers are 
compared at a single time.  The Air Force and the Army evaluate officers every 
12 months on individual ratee timelines.  This allows for more creative 
stratification as a rater can argue that the “#1” has changed over a short period. 
Promotion recommendations are integral to the forms in the Army, Navy, 
and the Marine Corps.  In the Army, this promotion recommendation is 
considered useless unless it is something other than “must promote” and “best 
qualified” (anonymous, personal communication, October 29, 2009).  In other 
words, “promote” and “fully qualified” (the next two options for promotion 
recommendation) are considered unfavorable.  The Navy is restricted in its 
promotion recommendations through forced distribution calculations.  With a 
larger number of officers being rated on, this method is a bit more useful.  The 
problem arises when a senior rater has only a small number of officers.  Not 
using the allocation of “must” and “early promotes” before the “promotable” 
option signifies a considerable downgrade.  In other words, promotion 
recommendations may either be actual recommendations or they may be 
selected only so as not to send a negative message to the board.  The Marine 
Corps has the most neutral promotion recommendation, as a “yes” or “no” option, 
with the possibility of an “accelerated promotion” recommendation.  This supports 
the culture of “on time” promotions.  The Air Force uses a separate promotion 
recommendation form, subject to restrictions, to recommend officers for 
promotion only when they are meeting a promotion board.  This is a form of 
forced distribution that, again, is difficult to use with small groups, does not 
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account for skewed distributions, and can conflict with the culture of the 
organization.  It does, however, reduce the use of creative stratification as the 
senior rater is ranking all officers at the same time. 
Overall, promotion boards are similar in that a representative group of 
senior officers are tasked with reviewing and comparing the records of all the 
officers eligible for consideration for promotion.  The methods used are slightly 
different and have some subtle nuances.  The Marine Corps has a separate vote 
to determine if below or above the zone officers are even competitive with the in-
the-zone officers.  If not, they are not even voted on for promotion selection.  This 
is in line with the culture of “on-time” promotions of the Marine Corps.  Both the 
Navy and the Marine Corps assign an advocate to each record up for promotion.  
They are then responsible for briefing the highlights and trends of that record to 
the rest of the board.  In the Army and the Air Force, board members either look 
at all the records (USA) and score them or look at a subset of records (AF) and 
score them.  Regardless of which service, informal processes are used to make 
decisions on promotion recommendations.  These processes by which boards 
make decisions filter down to the rest of the service to influence the way raters 
accomplish evaluations. 
The evaluation system is made up of many subsystems that interact and 
influence one another.  The implications of those interactions and influences are 
the subject of the next chapter. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The basic hypothesis of this research was that the organizational structure 
of the military; officer-specific reward and promotion systems; tasks, tools, and 
processes of evaluation; organizational culture; and the interaction between 
individuals influence personnel to inflate evaluations over time.  Each of these 
independent variables have been discussed either with respect to theory or in 
isolation to demonstrate what occurs.  The question now is how do each of these 
variables contribute towards inflationary tendencies? 
A. STRUCTURE 
The military organization, with respect to the evaluation system, is a 
professional machine that uses SOPs to direct the system and has professional 
individuals who operate within that system.  Reward and promotion systems are 
centralized and standardized within the military organization.  The evaluation 
tasks are decentralized to the individual professionals (officers), but the 
evaluations feed into the centralized system.  The military system is “up or out;” 
officers must promote in order to stay in the military without the uncertainty 
associated with continuation boards. 
The rater’s position within that system—executing decentralized activities 
(the evaluation) but without the ability to directly influence the decisions at the 
central level—establishes a degree of powerlessness.  While the rater may feel 
that the ratee is deserving of promotion or continuation in the military, it is 
ultimately not the rater’s decision.  In addition, force strength dictates from the 
USG may mean that officers are separated, even with competitive records.  The 
supervisor has the ability to distribute some elements of intrinsic rewards (such 
as position or responsibility), but does not have the power to change the basic 
extrinsic rewards that a member receives.  Inflation is the best option to influence 
centralized decisions. 
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B. REWARD AND PROMOTION SYSTEM 
The extrinsic military reward and promotion systems are centralized and 
standardized.  Rewards can be categorized as “task non-contingent rewards,” 
(Cameron & Pierce, 2002, p. 43) as they are given regardless of involvement in a 
specific activity or a specific level of accomplishment of an activity and are based 
solely on one’s position within the military with regards to rank and time-in-grade.  
There are some other elements of extrinsic reward that are specific to location or 
specialty (special pay), but they still apply to a broad group of people and they 
are not contingent on evaluation scores. 
The only way to increase basic extrinsic rewards (such as basic pay, basic 
allowances, and retirement pay, not including special pay) is to promote.  
Promotion is the concrete link between the evaluation system and rewards.  
More importantly, not promoting is a punishment in a system where lack of 
promotion at a pre-determined time can be basis for forced separation.  
Promotion decisions are centralized.  If a rater believes that a ratee is compatible 
with military service and deserves the opportunity to remain in, the only way to 
influence this is through the tool of evaluation, the formal and informal processes 
resident in the evaluation task, and their interaction at the promotion board.  
C. EVALUATION TOOLS, TASKS, AND PROCESSES 
The AF evaluation form is an essay method of evaluation.  This method is 
considered poor when attempting to compare across employees (Milkovich & 
Boudreau, 1994, p. 186).  It lacks structure and standardization in a standardized 
and centralized system.  While there are informal processes in play to delineate 
top officers (such as stratification), how do those informal processes compare 
across various specialties?  Some would argue that there are positions or 
specialties where even the bottom individual in one organization is better than 
the number one individual in another organization when considering obligations 
and responsibilities necessary for the next higher rank. The tool is completely 
reliant on the rater understanding the informal systems at play (stratification, 
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word usage, school and command recommendations) and on the rater’s writing 
ability.  In addition, the rater must understand how to portray the officer in such a 
way that the promotion board can accurately compare officers across a broad 
spectrum of traits and capabilities. 
An average AF O–5 promotion board involves approximately 25 people 
reviewing about 6,000 records in 3 weeks.  On a recent O–5 promotion board, 
5,923 officers were considered (including in-, above-, and below-the-zone).  Of 
the 1,412 officers considered in-the-zone, 1,045 were selected, for a promotion 
rate of 74%.  Above-the-zone officers were promoted at a 2.4% rate and below-
the-zone officers were promoted at a 4% rate.  Twenty percent of the total 
officers considered were promoted (Air Force Personnel Center, n.d.).   
Depending on what zone an officer is in, his/her record needs to be better 
than those not selected.  To ensure that, a record needs to sound as strong as it 
can against almost 6,000 other officers.  The rater does not personally know all 
these other officers and cannot ensure the other raters are not inflating.  In the 
LAF competitive category, there exists multiple specialties; a rater must ensure 
that an evaluation for an officer in the maintenance specialty can “compare” to an 
evaluation for an officer in the intelligence specialty.  These factors and the 
desire to get an individual promoted under the current system influences a rater 
to inflate an evaluation. 
D. CULTURE 
The professionals within the system are part of a culture.  At the broadest 
level, the services instill an overall culture of excellence, high standards, integrity, 
and loyalty.  At the sub-organizational (or unit level), an additional culture 
resides.  This culture advances the notion that individuals within that unit (or 
occupation) are better than other units (or occupations).  While an individual may 
be average within a specific unit, the culture of that unit is that they are surely 
better than anyone else.  Therefore, the average officer is perceived as above 
average when compared to unknowns outside the unit.   
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In order for an officer to stay in the military, he/she must promote.  
Evaluations are decentralized, but promotion decisions are not.  Raters have a 
lack of control with respect to promotions, and the only way to influence 
promotion is through evaluations.  In order to promote in a centralized system, 
that officer must have a competitive evaluation.  The rater writing that evaluation 
knows the system, is influenced by the culture, and makes a rational decision 
based on those interactions.  As is frequently stated, “records get promoted, not 
people.”   
While Robbert et al. (1997) postulate that military members are not as 
motivated by extrinsic rewards, the only way to change the value of the basic 
reward is to promote.  Conversely, the lack of promotion is a penalty as that 
could lead to forced separation from the military in an “up or out” system.  
Currently, continuation boards are recommending most officers for continuation; 
that is not always going to be the case.  The current officer extrinsic reward 
system is the same for everyone else in the military.  The only way to promote is 
to have a competitive record. 
Military officers are assumed to be rational beings.  They will make the 
best choice with respect to their objective.  The general objective is to take care 
of one’s people.  That is realized through many ways, including strong 
evaluations that will ultimately lead to promotion.  As evaluations are done 
locally, but promotion decisions are executed centrally, the rater will do his/her 
best to ensure that an evaluation is competitive.  This leads a rater to inflate an 
evaluation, while using an informal system to distinguish the true top officers.  
This feeds into the culture of the military—average is perceived as inadequate.  
To avoid that perception, the rater inflates.  An average (which may still be well 
above the average for the population) becomes an outstanding.   
E. PEOPLE AND GAME THEORY 
The previous subsystems are somewhat static with regard to the 
pressures towards inflation.  The previous subsystems exist.  Their existence, by 
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themselves, does not cause inflation.  The only way inflation happens is through 
the decision of an individual to fill out an evaluation form in a specific way.  
Inflation is a cognitive process by an individual based on influences from the 
other subsystems.  Individuals within the military are assumed to be rational 
beings that act in a rational manner in order to maximize their choices.  Based on 
this assumption, the individuals within the military accomplishing a performance 
evaluation can be modeled through game theory.   
Based on the culture of the military, and even more so, the culture of 
individual units or sub-organizations, supervisors generally try to “take care of 
their people.”  Competition often exists between units or job specialties, and it is 
easy to project the idea that most members of an organization are above 
average.  This culture of “above average” or “excellence” is resident in the overall 
military culture and in the individual unit identity or sub-organization identity.    An 
individual will naturally feel loyalty and pride in one’s own unit or one’s own 
profession.  This pride and loyalty may lead to the attitude that individuals within 
a unit or profession are superior to those in another unit or profession.  It would 
be a natural inclination for a supervisor to want his/her subordinate (a known 
entity) to be promoted (and therefore, retained) versus an individual in another 
unit (a potential unknown), halfway across the world (and a competition to his/her 
subordinate).  This perception is relevant to inflation tendencies when promotion 
decisions are centralized and not controlled by individual units.  The games 
modeled below are based on the decision to write an evaluation on the “average” 
person, not those who stand out as well below average.  The assumption is that 
the tendency to inflate evaluations is not as prevalent when dealing with obvious 
underperformers. 
In accordance with game theory (Freeman, 1996), individual choices that 
are not diametrically opposed can be modeled within the context of partial-
conflict games.  In the case of a large organization that makes promotion 
decisions at a central location, it is most useful to look at non-cooperative games 
in order to model rational decisions (Freeman, 1996, p. 579).  Non-cooperative 
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games are most relevant when no binding agreement can be made or enforced.  
Communication can occur, but there is no guarantee that a person will choose as 
promised.  A key element of non-cooperative games is that, in the end, self-
interests may actually lead to a lower payoff for both players than that which can 
be accomplished by cooperation, and by extension, to sub-optimization for an 
overall system. 
In this evaluation non-cooperative game, two dominant attitudes of the 
military individual (rater) are assumed.  First, a rater’s loyalty to the organization 
and its formal systems outweigh the loyalty to the ratee.  A rater believes in the 
systems established for evaluation, promotion, assignments, and other human 
resource decisions.  For the purposes of evaluations, a rater would choose to 
write an accurate evaluation if others were also writing accurate evaluations; 
conversely, a rater would write an inflated evaluation if others were writing 
inflated evaluations.  Even while inflation is considered dysfunctional under this 
attitude, at least everyone is on the same level if everyone writes either accurate 
or inflated evaluations. 
The second attitude is that a rater’s loyalty to the ratee outweighs the 
loyalty to the organization and its systems.  For the purposes of evaluation, a 
rater would choose to write an accurate or inflated evaluation based on whether it 
was more advantageous to the advancement of the ratee. 
Longenecker and Ludwig (1990) list multiple reasons why a rater would 
choose to be lenient and inflate ratings:  foster employee motivation, maximize 
potential rewards, avoid damage to an employee’s career, reward performance, 
reward effort, and due to a personal liking of the individual.  In addition, there are 
deviant reasons for a rater to inflate an evaluation: avoiding airing “dirty laundry,” 
avoiding conflict/confrontation with employee, and promoting an employee out of 
their organization. 
Probably the most widely known partial conflict games are the Game of 
Chicken (where there is no dominant strategy) or the Prisoner’s Dilemma (where 
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there is a dominant strategy).  The Game of Chicken most closely resembles the 
first attitude, with no dominant strategy.  The Prisoner’s Dilemma most closely 
resembles the second attitude, with a dominant strategy. 
1. Game of Chicken 
Figure 3 depicts the values assigned for the Game of Chicken.  A “4” 
represents the player’s best choice.  A “1” represents the player’s worst choice.  
The first value in the parentheses is Driver 1’s values; the second value is Driver 
2’s values.  Each player strives to maximize his/her value.  If Driver 1 knew that 
Driver 2 was going to swerve, Driver 1 can maximize his values by choosing “Not 
Swerve” (for a value of 4,2). If Driver 1 knew Driver 2 was not going to swerve, 
Driver 1 would maximize his values by choosing “Swerve” (for a value of 2,4).  
The same is true in reverse.  However, each driver’s best choice is dependent on 
what the other driver does.  If each driver attempts to gain his/her highest value 
of “4” by not swerving, it results in the worst possible state for both – impact (1,1).  
Both (4,2) and (2,4) are Nash equilibria – neither player can unilaterally improve 
his/her score.  While the second best option is for both players to swerve (for a 
value of [3,3]), it is an unstable situation.  Both players may promise to swerve, 
but it is in each person’s self-serving interest to not swerve and potentially gain 
the highest payoff of “4.”  In this game, the choices are interdependent and 




Figure 3.   The Game of Chicken (From Freeman, 1996, p. 584) 
This game is similar to the first attitude of loyalty to the system over loyalty 
to the ratee. For system loyalty, ordinal rankings of preference are listed in  
Table 4: 
 Evaluation quality Reason 
4 (Best) DNI*/DNI 
 Integrity/honesty 
 Allows system to work as planned 
 No unwritten “rules” 
3 I**/I 
 People are matched in inflated system 
 Can use “unwritten rules” to show true ranking 
 Reduced conflict w/potentially unhappy ratees 
 Motivation 
 Maximize rewards 
 Reward behavior 
2 I/DNI 
 Allows subordinate an advantage 
 Reduced conflict w/potentially unhappy ratees 
 Motivation 
 Maximize rewards 
 Reward behavior 
1 (Worst) DNI/I  Subordinate is disadvantaged 
* DNI = Do Not Inflate 
** I = Inflate 
Table 4.   Rater Preferences for Evaluation Quality (Loyalty to System) 
A variation of this game has choices 2 and 3 swapped.  This does not 















Figure 5.   Loyalty to System Game (2nd Iteration) 
These game models tell us that the state of everyone writing accurate 
evaluations (DNI, DNI) and everyone writing inflated evaluations (I,I) are Nash 
equilibria.  In both these states, it is not beneficial for an individual to make a 
choice other than what has been made, if their loyalty is to the system.  If the 
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equilibrium is DNI/DNI (for a value of 4/4), and one chose to inflate an evaluation, 
that choice would be less optimal for the inflator, and the worst choice for the one 
choosing to not inflate (for a value of 3/1 or 1/3; or 2/1 or 1/2).  Once one 
supervisor inflates, the others will also eventually inflate to get their next best 
option of I/I (for a value of 3/3).  This situation quickly moves towards the Nash 
equilibrium of all players inflating evaluations. 
It is easy to see that even if a majority of the raters had a greater loyalty to 
the organization and the system, it only takes a few people to make a decision to 
inflate an evaluation before everyone does, regardless of the rater’s attitude.  
This situation occurs when either a system-loyal individual makes an “irrational” 
choice or when the system includes individuals of a different attitude, one where 
the loyalty is to the ratee (comrade) rather than the system.  This is the second 
viewpoint, and probably more realistic based on military culture. 
2. Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 depict the values assigned for Prisoner’s Dilemma.  
The value of “4” is the best choice and “1” is the worst choice.  Each player 
strives to maximize his/her value.  If the blue player chooses to arm (“A”), the red 
player can maximize his value by also choosing to arm (value of 2,2).  If the blue 
player chooses to disarm (“D”), the red player can maximize again by choosing to 
arm (value of 4,1).  The same is true in reverse.  In both cases, without 
communication or without the ability to ensure compliance with a promised 
decision, it is in each player’s dominant strategy to choose to arm (“A”), or rather, 
to get his maximum value regardless of what the other player chooses.  This is a 
Nash equilibrium; a state where no player can unilaterally choose another path 
and increase his/her value.   
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Figure 6.   Prisoner’s Dilemma (Arms Race – From Freeman, 1996, p. 581) 
  
Figure 7.   Prisoner’s Dilemma (Arms Race – From Freeman, 1996, p. 581) 
Both players end up with their second worst option if they play selfishly; if 
they cooperate, they could realize their second best choice of mutual 
disarmament.  





 Evaluation quality Reason 
4 (Best) I*/DNI** 
 Allows subordinate an advantage 
 Reduced conflict w/potentially unhappy ratees 
 Motivation 
 Maximize rewards 
 Reward behavior 
3 I/I 
 People are matched in inflated system 
 Can use “unwritten rules” to show true ranking 
 Reduced conflict w/potentially unhappy ratees 
 Motivation 
 Maximize rewards 
 Reward behavior 
2 DNI/DNI 
 Integrity/honesty 
 Allows system to work as planned 
 No unwritten “rules”  
1 (Worst) DNI/I  Subordinate is disadvantaged 
* I = Inflate  
** DNI = Do Not Inflate 
Table 5.   Rater Preferences for Evaluation Quality (Loyalty to Ratee) 
A variation of this game has choices 2 and 3 swapped.  This does not 
















Figure 9.   Loyalty to Ratee Game (2nd Iteration) 
In both these game models, it is obvious that each rater has a dominant 
strategy of choosing to inflate evaluations.  The state of everyone choosing to 
inflate evaluations is a Nash equilibrium, no one person can unilaterally improve 
his/her state.  In the case of Figure 9, where each rater believes that I/I is the 
second best choice (for a value of 3/3), cooperation in not inflating would not 
improve their status (it would reduce to a value of 2/2). 
Based on previous reports of perceptions of evaluation systems, a military 
culture that stresses loyalty to comrades, and the way evaluations feed into the 
reward system through the promotion system, this scenario is the most likely.  
For instances outside the obvious underperformer, it is the rater’s dominant 
strategy to inflate evaluations. 
Each subsystem of the evaluation system has its own driving force 
towards inflation. 
 72
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 73
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONGRUENCE AND FIT 
Nadler and Tushman (1997, p. 35) state that an organization’s 
performance depends on the congruence, or fit, of the elements within the 
organization.  If the elements within the organization are a tight fit, the resultant 
performance will be higher.  The current USAF evaluation system is inflated.  The 
USAF system, as with the other service systems, has attempted to curtail 
inflation many times throughout its history.  Yet, the system always seems to 
revert to an inflated state.  Subsystems and their interaction with each other must 
be such that they promote inflation.  The current configuration of subsystems 
within the evaluation system must be congruent with inflation.   
Changing one or two elements within the system will not necessarily 
cause the other elements to conform and produce the desired performance 
(Mercer-Delta, 1998).  The USAF has attempted to change the evaluation tool 
multiple times over its history.  That one element is not enough to change the 
desired output.  
If the design purpose of the evaluation system is that of a reliable record 
of performance that can be used to identify the best qualified officers for various 
human resource decisions (promotion, assignment, etc.), then the subsystems 
must support that goal.  Based on the concept that an accurate assessment of an 
individual is more useful than an inflated assessment, an evaluation system 
congruent with accuracy would produce accurate evaluations. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
In order to combat inflation, one cannot just address the tool used for 
evaluation.   As shown in Figure 1, the evaluation system is comprised of 
structure, culture, tasks/tools, people, and reward systems.  It is influenced by 
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system inputs (environment, resources, and history) and by the interaction of the 
subsystems within.  If the desired performance is not achieved, it may be due to 
either an incongruence in the system or a congruence of elements that produce 
the wrong performance.  In order for the system to produce the desired 
performance, one must address some, if not all, of the elements within the 
system in order for change to work.  Changing one element, the tool, has not 
worked in the past.  Of the independent variables evaluated, there are obviously 
some things that cannot be changed, or at least, not changed easily. 
The military organizational structure is unlikely to change solely to reduce 
evaluation inflation.  It is governed by Congress and U.S. code.  Its size, function, 
and place within the larger governmental organization has influenced its current 
configuration.  To change it would require a massive overhaul. 
The reward system is a standardized reward system enacted and voted 
on by Congress.  Elements within services do not have individual control over the 
extrinsic reward system.  While RAND did a study to see if the reward system 
could be changed (Robbert et al., 1997) to influence desired behaviors, this has 
not happened.  This would require reward decisions (both promotion as a reward 
and monetary compensation) be decentralized.  This is unlikely to happen based 
on the organizational structure of the military and the methods by which force 
structures are maintained. 
The promotion system is systematic and standardized based on force 
strength requirements.  An officer is considered for promotion based solely on 
time-in-grade.  As military officers rarely stay in one location their entire career, it 
may be more relevant to promote at a central location based on the needs of the 
Air Force to ensure mobility throughout the organization.  Promotion decisions 
are unlikely to be decentralized. 
However, a potential change to the promotion system would be 
formalization of alternate career paths, or specifically, an elimination of the “up or 
out” system.  These alternate career paths would allow officers to pursue a 
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career that does not involve promotion at the predetermined points.  
Consequently, there may be reduced pressure to inflate as promotion is not the 
only viable career path.  In the military, increased rank generally means 
increased responsibility and increased requirements for command skill.  If an 
officer, instead, chooses to follow a specialized path that develops depth of skill 
in one area at the expense of broadening opportunities, that path would have to 
have a commensurate reward system in place that would “reward” that choice.   
This change in structure (traditional career paths) also supports current 
calls for expertise over broadness in certain fields (Mullen, 2009).  The 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, summarized in a recent speech that there are 
service challenges now where expertise in a field does not fit into the normal 
career progression of military officers (2009), resulting in potential negative 
career consequences. 
While length of service currently results in increased pay, it flattens out at 
certain years of service.  For an O–1, maximum pay is reached at 3 years; O–2, 
at 6 years; O–3 at 14 years; O–4 at 18 years; and an O–5 at 22 years.  While 
being a 20-year Lieutenant is probably not realistic, it may be realistic to have a 
career O–3 or O–4.  As structure interacts with the rewards system, pay would 
need to increase throughout, based on years of service.  This increase may not 
be as much as that experienced with increase in rank, as the responsibilities 
associated with increase in rank suggests a commensurate increase in pay. 
This does not mean that everyone who joins the military is guaranteed a 
career.  Plenty of individuals join the military and then leave prior to retirement for 
various reasons.  The military would still need a way to separate individuals who 
do not meet the stated standards for continued employment.  The military would 
still need to have a system to maintain mandated force structures, through 
recruitment, promotion, separation, and retirements.  During force reductions, a 
system would still need to differentiate individuals so that separation decisions 
could be made. 
 76
This change in structure would need to be congruent with the evaluation 
system to be able to identify individuals for promotion, continuance in current 
grade, or separation.  In the current evaluation system, this element of “up or out” 
alone seems to lead one towards inflation based on game theory – raters 
generally want to give their ratees the best chance of promotion or the best 
chance to remain in the military for an entire career.  Because of this, the 
structure is not the only thing that must change. 
Structure interacts with the culture, people, and task/tools.  These three 
elements of the evaluation system are so intertwined that they cannot be 
discussed separately.  To talk about one is to describe its influence on another. 
The culture of the military was described in Chapter II.  Summarized, it is 
one of excellence, high standards, integrity, and loyalty.  The tool used to 
evaluate an officer needs to be congruent with that element of culture.  Many 
organizations are comprised of individuals who were consistently at the top of 
their training in order to reach their current position.  A tool that then ranks 
individuals as average or below average will probably not be accepted; and if 
accepted, it is destined to be manipulated and inflated solely based on culture.  
The BARS system used by the Navy and the Marine Corps describes actions in 
relation to standards (Navy) or actions in themselves, without comparison to 
standards (Marine Corps).  In this manner, standards, as high or low as they may 
be, are what a ratee is measured against—not an individual as “average.”   
Another element of culture that would require change is the expectation 
that one will receive “high marks.”  Raters must be trained to give realistic 
ratings; officers must accept realistic ratings; and, ultimately, promotion board 
members must accept and embrace the changes.  If realistic appraisals are not 




Evaluation tools, as previously described, also need to be congruent with 
the other elements.  BARS and rating systems are just as susceptible to inflation 
as any other system.  Dillworth (1971, pp. 2–3) described one instance of 
inflation in the USA: 
About 75 percent of all captains in 1922 received rating of less than 
excellent.  Less than 5 percent of them received the top rating of 
“superior” and only about 22 percent received an “excellent” 
rating…This breakout resulted in a typical Gaussian (distribution) 
curve.  After 1924, the inflation problem became more apparent 
year by year, and, by 1945, 99 percent of the officer corps was 
receiving one of the top two ratings. 
The AF, during the 1960s, attempted a “9–4” scale system.  Performance 
factors were graded on a 9-point scale.  Promotion potential was graded on a 4-
point scale.  “By 1968 ratings inflation had once again rendered the OER system 
ineffective.  Nine out of ten officers received the highest rating, 9–4” (Syllogistics, 
1987, p. I-2).   
A change in tool alone will not combat inflation.  It may initially curb it, but 
the interaction with the other elements within the system will result in inflation.  
Amis, Slack, and Hinings (2002, p.436) concluded that  
organizations that contained members who held values congruent 
with the prescribed changes were able to successfully engage in 
the transition process. Conversely, those organizations with 
members who opposed the change entered into a period of largely 
superficial conformity, mainly in response to certain coercive 
pressures, but ultimately reverted to designs more consistent with 
the values held within the organization. 
To make the tool work as intended, the individual writing the evaluation 
also has to be “changed.”  As discussed in the game theory section, inflation is a 
rater’s dominant strategy, whether the rater has more loyalty to the system or to 
the ratee.  Something has to influence the rater to make a different decision.  
Changing the culture of an organization does not happen instantaneously and 
may be difficult to change (Schein, 2004, p. 14).  There are, however, immediate 
methods to induce compliance, even if not supported by organizational culture. 
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Direct control of the rater’s ability to give a ratee a specific score, as in the 
ACOM/COM system currently in use in the USA, and in the controlled OER era 
(Syllogistics, 1987, p. I-5) results in strategic manipulation of scores based on 
whether one is coming up on a promotion board or not, or receives outright 
resistance.  Creating a “profile” of a rater based on the scores he/she has given 
and using that for relative rankings and/or using that as an input to the rater’s 
own evaluation places an incentive on the rater to adhere to the system.  In the 
Marine Corps, rating seniors’ and reviewing officers’ profiles are monitored to 
ensure they are adhering to the intent of the evaluation system.  If not, they are 
directly contacted and warned.  If their behavior does not change, their raters are 
contacted.  This makes their actions (the written evaluation) potentially 
“punishable.”  In other words, the evaluator is now held accountable for the 
evaluations given. 
In the Navy, an evaluation is given a score, and that score is compared to 
the rater’s profile.  On a 5-point scale, a 4.0 score with a rater average of 3.5 
shows a relative rating of “above average.”  Conversely, a 4.0 score with a rater 
average of 4.5 shows a relative rating of “below average” for that rater.  The 
Marine Corps takes that method one step further and gives both a static relative 
rating (computed at the time the evaluation was completed) and a dynamic 
relative rating (which is recomputed based on the rating senior’s updated 
average).  This is yet another method to “change” the behavior, or influence the 
rational choice, of the rating official.  This method influences the rater’s behavior 
not only in the present, but also in the future.  Future profiles will affect past 
evaluations.   
Rational choice theory states that without any external influence, an 
individual will choose either a dominant strategy or will choose to maximize the 
value of the worst choice.  With external influence, that rational choice can be 
altered.  That external influence, in the case of evaluations, is to make the rater’s 
choices directly influence him or herself, to make the rater accountable for the 
evaluation. 
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In order to develop a rater’s profile, the tool must support statistical 
computations.  The current AF evaluation form is an essay-type tool; it does not 
support the above methods.  Previous methods did support statistical 
computations but were abandoned due to inflation.  They did not use those 
scores to hold the rater accountable. 
To curb strategic manipulation of words or rankings, mass general 
reporting timelines should be implemented.  While this will not eliminate inflation 
or manipulation, it will make it harder to do so.   This would reduce the amount of 
individual tracking required to accomplish evaluations, but it would also increase 
the workload during the mass reporting dates.  With a change in the evaluation 
method to a less essay-intensive tool and a change in the informal process of 
“white space” in essay blocks indicating below average performance, the mass 
reporting workload would be less and the overall benefits may outweigh this 
change. 
In the end, to minimize inflation or at least be able to control inflation, 
multiple subsystems within the system require change.  Subsystem changes 
must be coordinated and should happen in an appropriately sequenced manner; 
leadership must embrace and promulgate the changes; and raters (at all levels) 
must be held accountable.  The change in procedures or rater’s methods cannot 
happen individually as those who change will be at a disadvantage to those who 
do not change. 
C. RECOMMENDATION 
In summary: 
 Military structure leads to inflation based on the lack of 
control at lower levels 
 Military promotions and reward systems support inflation 
 In military culture, “average” is not good; culture supports 
inflation 
 Human nature and rational choice theory has a dominant 
strategy—inflation 
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To counter inflation: 
 Structure 
 Eliminate the “up or out” system 
 And/or, make promotion decisions at lower levels (but 
this has a low chance of implementation) 
 Rewards 
 Reward accuracy/punish inflation 
 Reward alternative career paths 
 Culture 
 Train officers to give and accept accurate evaluations 
 Demonstrate through word and deed that meeting 
high standards is acceptable 
 People 
 Hold raters accountable through profiles 
 Provide incentives for raters to comply with the stated 
system 
 Tool 
 Institute some method of measurement (such as 
BARS) that supports statistical analysis 
 Based on the heterogeneous mix in the LAF 
competitive category, the tool should allow for 
qualitative explanations (essay) 
One has to ask if the current system accomplishes its stated task.  Does 
the current evaluation system “provide meaningful feedback to individuals”?  
Does it provide a “reliable, long-term, cumulative record of performance and 
potential based on that performance”?  Does it “provide officer central selection 
boards… sound information to assist in identifying the best qualified officers” 
(USAF, 2005, p. 6)?  This research did not tackle the issues of determining if 
individuals received meaningful feedback, whether records of performance and 
potential were reliable, nor did it determine if the officers who have been 
promoted were truly the best qualified.  Instead, this research assumed that un-
inflated evaluations would, in turn, satisfy the stated objectives of the system.  
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While the current system functions, inflation is detrimental, time-consuming, 
requires the use of informal processes to operate, and makes it harder to easily 
differentiate between individuals.  Because the system functions, change is not 
necessarily required. 
To attempt to combat inflation, multiple changes have to happen; it has to 
be a “whole of system” approach to change.  Within a system, elements interact 
and influence the operation of others.  Changing only the evaluation tool in 
isolation has not solved the inflation problem.  At a minimum, the tool must either 
be consistent with the culture or the culture must change; the people within the 
system must be persuaded to correctly use the tool, which should include 
personal accountability as a measure of correct use.  The structure of the 
organization (larger military organization) and the promotion and award systems, 
while also potential subsystems to change, are unlikely to change only to 
“combat inflation;” changing the structure of the larger military organization would 
affect the other services and would likely require other, more important reasons 
for that magnitude of change.  Of all the independent variables studied, these 
three (culture, tool, and people) are the easiest to alter at a service level. 
D. RECOMMENDED FURTHER STUDY 
Throughout this research, complimentary ideas for further research 
emerged.  These ideas (or questions) delve deeper into various elements that 
influence evaluation inflation or further refine how changes may be made to the 
current system. 
 How exactly would the changes in the subsystems need to 
be sequenced in order to minimize upheaval, elicit support 
for change, and increase the likelihood of acceptance and 
proper implementation? 
 Is there a difference between training evaluations and yearly 
evaluations with respect to levels of inflation?  If so, what 
elements in that system of evaluation are congruent with 
accuracy as opposed to inflation?  If so, can those elements 
be exported to the larger system of yearly evaluation? 
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 Would a change of competitive categories encourage more 
accurate evaluations by limiting competition to only within 
specialties (no more comparison across groups, only 
within)? 
 Are the right people in the right jobs—have the evaluation, 
promotion, and assignment systems been effective in 
managing human resources?  Has inflation affected the 
accuracy of the current systems? 
 Does inflation correlate to times of growth or contraction in 
military force strength?  Is there a stronger tendency to 
inflate during times of contraction where opportunities for 
continuation and promotion are limited?  Is there less 
inflation when promotion and continuation rates are high? 
These further research ideas are by no means exhaustive, but only serve 
to illuminate the multitude of other issues influencing inflation in evaluations and 
the need to look at factors outside the evaluation tool when approaching the 
inflation issue. 
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